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INTRODUCTION
While traveling Interstate 95 in Eastern North Carolina, near the
tributaries of Lake Gaston, passing motorists are often struck by an
ornate building rising out of an otherwise barren field. This 35,000
square foot structure was, until very recently, known as the Roanoke
Rapids Theatre, although in its brief six-year history North Carolina
commentators have called the project many less-flattering names.
The Roanoke Rapids Theatre began with great promise-the
$21.5 million facility "was to be the anchor tenant of the Carolina
Crossroads Music and Entertainment District, a 1,000-acre
entertainment and retail development." 2 The theatre was managed by
Randy Parton, the less-famous brother of country singer Dolly
Parton.' On July 26, 2007, the 1,500-seat facility opened its doors to a
1. See, e.g., Don Carrington, Randy Parton Theatre Still Haunts Roanoke Rapids:
City Struggles with Debt from Failed Entertainment Project, CAROLINA J. ONLINE (Oct.
31, 2011), http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/displayexclusive.html?id=8427
(characterizing the project as a "white elephant," a "nightmare," and a "cautionary
lesson"); Report Urges Tax Increment Financing Reforms: Parton Theatre Controversy
Shows Need for Change, CAROLINA J. ONLINE (June 16, 2008),
http://www.carolinajournal.comlissues/display-story.html?id=4784 (quoting the John
Locke Foundation's Daren Baskt as saying, "North Carolina's experience to date with
TIFs has been nothing short of a disaster," and describing the Roanoke Rapids Theatre as
a "failure").
2. See Carrington, supra note 1.
3. Id. (stating that the facility was originally named the "Randy Parton Theatre");
see also David Zucchino, Show Goes On Without 'Star,' L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2007, at A10
(describing the opening of the Randy Parton Theatre, which featured a duet between
Dolly and Randy Parton, and a statement from Dolly Parton that her Tennessee theme
park, where Randy had previously performed, would miss his services).
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sold-out crowd4 anxious to hear the performance of Randy Parton
and his newly formed ensemble, the Moonlight Bandits.'
Shortly thereafter, the music stopped for the Roanoke Rapids
Theatre. The City of Roanoke Rapids dismissed Parton and his
ensemble from their managerial duties in November 2007,6 and the
debt incurred in financing the theatre began to loom large for the city,
which had issued the bonds to finance the project.' The city soon
attempted to sell the theatre multiple times without success,' and the
facility struggled to attract performers.' To offset its mounting debt
service, Roanoke Rapids leased the facility to Arkansas-based HSV
Entertainment, which has used the facility as an "internet
sweepstakes and entertainment venue," although its future is now in
doubt. o
In many ways, the theatre's history parallels that of the debt-
financing instrument used to fund the project: tax increment financing
4. See Carrington, supra note 1.
5. See Don Carrington, Parton Payback Incentive Dropped: State Treasurer's Staff
Had Asked That He Be Paid Last, Not First, CAROLINA J. ONLINE (Sept. 10, 2007),
http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display-exclusive.html?id=4300 (describing
attendance problems after Parton's first show with the Moonlight Bandits on July 26,
2007).
6. See Carrington, supra note 1.
7. See id. (noting that Roanoke Rapids borrowed $21.5 million to finance the
theatre). Originally, Parton was to pay the debt for the TIF bonds from the theatre's
revenues, with an option to purchase the theatre for $1 after the debt was retired. Id.
8. Compare Roger Bell, New Theater Proposal on the Table: City Not Planning on
Refiling Suit Against Gatting, DAILY HERALD (Roanoke, N.C.), May 30,2012, at 1 (noting
that, according to Gatling's lawyer, "Gatling is not a part of the latest theater proposal"),
with Beau Minnick, Roanoke Rapids Mayor Says Selling Theater is Best, WRAL.COM
(Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/10457812/ (reporting that the City of
Roanoke Rapids had "unanimously approved" a sale of the Theatre to Chicago
businessman Lafayette Gatling).
9. For example, in 2011, there were only four events scheduled for the entire year.
See Events for 2011, ROANOKE RAPIDS THEATRE, http://rrcitytheatre.com/Perfomances-
Events/year.listevents/2011/10/19/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
10. The Royal Palace Theatre Opens Wednesday, DAILY HERALD (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://www.rrdailyherald.com/access/the-royal-palace-theatre-opens-
wednesday/article_88088fla-fc4a-1lel-bl07-0019bb2963f4.html; see also Roger Bell,
Internet Cafg Concern Grows Locally, DAILY HERALD (June 28, 2012),
http://www.rrdailyherald.com/news/internet-cafe-concern-grows-locally/article-d2fc9f5a-
cl23-llel-b4d4-00la4bcf887a.html (noting the opposition of several religious leaders to
the use of the facility for online "gambling" and suggesting the theatre consider alternative
purchasers). In December 2012, the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld a state
statute prohibiting Internet sweepstakes businesses in the state, which may hinder the
Royal Palace's viability. See Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue, No. 169A11-2, 2012
WL 6218202, at *11 (N.C. Dec. 14,2012).
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("TIF")." Nationally, TIF is used as a public finance tool by local
governments to make public improvements that will spur private
investment in a defined area.12 These improvements are paid for
through increases in property values (and property tax revenues)
surrounding the public improvements and private investments in the
TIF district." In 2004, voters approved an amendment to the North
Carolina Constitution to allow local government entities to utilize
TIF, making North Carolina the forty-ninth state to pass legislation
allowing for its use.14 Some welcomed the passage of North Carolina's
amendment with much acclaim;" however, TIF has proven to be a
sparsely used financing instrument in the state. 6
This Comment argues that North Carolina's TIF statute is
infrequently used for multiple reasons, including its complexity, the
availability of alternative financing forms, the constrictive nature of
TIF's statutory structure, and other ancillary factors such as a
nationwide decrease in demand for municipal bonds and negative
perceptions surrounding the Roanoke Rapids Theatre. This
Comment further suggests revisions to the statute that could make
TIF a more viable debt-financing instrument in the state. Possible
revisions include eliminating current restrictions that limit a TIF
district's size to no more than five percent of a municipality's total
land, requiring or allowing cities and counties to pledge additional
securities for repayment of TIF bonds, and increasing the scrutiny
applied by the Local Government Commission when considering TIF
projects. This Comment further argues that if North Carolina does
not revise its TIF statute, it should either eliminate TIF as a public
finance instrument or limit its use to projects supervised by
developers who have undergone an extensive vetting process. This
11. Tax Increment Financing is known as "Project Development Financing" in North
Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-101 (2011).
12. Joseph Blocher & Jonathan Q. Morgan, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill Sch. of
Gov't, Questions About Tax Increment Financing in North Carolina, 5 COMMUNITY AND
ECON. DEv. BULL. 1, 3 (2008), http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs/cedb5.pdf.
13. Id. at 2-3.
14. See id. at 2.
15. See generally Ken Elkins, North Carolina's New Deal, CHARLOTTE BUS. J. (Feb.
21, 2005), http://www.bizjournals.com/charlottelstories/2005/02/21/focusl.htmi (reporting
the enthusiasm of various economic development officials at the TIF statute's passing).
16. As of June 2008, there were three total TIF project authorizations in North
Carolina. See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 11. Only two of these projects actually
used TIF debt financing. See Mike Legg, Huge Milestone in Research Campus Funding,
KANNAPOLIS (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.cityofkannapolis.com/huge-milestone-in-
research-campus-financing/ (explaining the City of Kannapolis's decision to choose a
different form of financing to fund the North Carolina Research Campus, despite
receiving authorization to use TIF debt).
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Comment lastly suggests that reforms should focus on "synthetic"
TIF, a structurally similar counterpart to TIF that does not confine
revenues solely to increments and which uses various other financing
structures to accomplish TIF's ends.
Part I provides a general background of TIF, including its
mechanics and the praise and common criticisms it has received. Part
II offers a statutory analysis of the American Planning Association's
Model TIF Statute, TIF statutes in states where TIF has been used
aggressively, and TIF statutes in states that have taken a more
conservative approach. Part III provides a brief legislative history of
North Carolina's adoption of TIF, explains North Carolina's statute
in depth, and compares its elements to the various statutes discussed
in Part II. Part IV provides brief summaries of the three authorized
TIF projects to date in North Carolina as well as takeaway lessons
from each. Finally, Part V provides a survey of non-statutory reasons
that TIF may have stalled in North Carolina, including various
alternative forms of debt financing available in North Carolina and
other environmental factors. The Conclusion expands upon the
arguments expressed above and highlights recent legislative and
administrative developments that may impact the use of TIF in North
Carolina.
I. WHAT IS TAX INCREMENT FINANCING?
A. Brief History, a Typical Model, Praise and Criticisms
TIF is a method of advancing community or economic
development by allowing local governments to issue bonds to help
develop, in conjunction with a private developer, a defined "TIF
district" for commercial use." The TIF process often proceeds as
follows. First, a TIF district's geographic boundaries are identified."
Then, the economic developers, city administrators, or other parties
promoting the TIF must gain approval to establish a TIF district from
the local government entity and/or a designated state agency.' 9 Then,
17. P. Michael Juby, Recent Development, Tax Increment Financing in North
Carolina: The Myth of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1526, 1526
(2005).
18. COUNCIL OF DEv. FIN. AGENCIES AND INT'L COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS,
TAX INCREMENT FINANCING BEST PRACTICES REFERENCE GUIDE 2 (2007) [hereinafter
CDFA BEST PRACTICES], http://www.icsc.org/government/CDFA.pdf.
19. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT § 457.085 (2007). See generally COUNCIL OF DEV. FIN.
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the local government's finance officer will establish a base valuation
of all property in the TIF district, which is used to determine the
amount of incremental property tax value increases over time.2 0 Next,
the local government entity secures funds by issuing bonds to develop
an asset or to address infrastructure needs that are designed to spur
development in the TIF district. 2 1 These bonds are secured by a local
government's pledge of future increases in property tax increments
within a defined TIF district.22 Finally, the local government entity
uses the tax revenue from these incremental increases to repay the
TIF bonds. Repayment through increments is the central feature of
TIF's structure and is what differentiates it from other forms of public
debt.2 4 Ideally, projects funded by TIF create increases in taxable
property values, resulting in more tax revenue with which to repay
the initial debt issuance. 25 TIFs are often passed without a vote,26 and
in many states, TIFs are one of the few options a municipality can use
(explaining approval mechanisms for forty-nine states with TIF statutes, where states
utilize various combinations of state, municipal, commission, and school board approvals
for TIF districts). Some states, including North Carolina, require not only that a local
government approve the project, but also that a description of the TIF district and a
development plan be submitted to a state agency for approval. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 32-285 (West Supp. 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1771 (2001); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5226 (West Supp. 2011); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch, 400, § 2
(LexisNexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.1803 (West 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 5-15-21 (West Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-104 (2011); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 457.085(2), (3) (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17C-1-405(2) (LexisNexis 2009); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 1892 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-18-6 (LexisNexis 2011).
20. See CDFA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 18, at 2.
21. See, e.g., Josh Reinert, Comment, Tax Increment Financing in Missouri: Is it Time
for Blight and But-For To Go?, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1019,1020 (2001). As addressed in the
following paragraphs, after obtaining the bond revenues, the local government can use the
funds for numerous purposes-such as improvements to infrastructure, demolishing
decayed infrastructure, and other up-front expenses-with the hope of spurring private
development.
22. See Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the
Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 67-68 (2010).
23. CDFA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 18, at 2.
24. See infra Part V.A.
25. See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 3; see also William C. Rivenbark, Shea
Riggsbee Denning, & Kara A. Millonzi, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill Sch. Of Gov't, 2007
Legislation Expands Scope of Project Development Financing in North Carolina, 36 LOC.
FIN. BULL. 1 (Nov. 2007), http://sogpubs.unc.edulelectronieversions/pdfs/lfb36.pdf ("The
debt incurred by funding the improvements is repaid ... by tax increment revenue-the
additional property taxes resulting from the district's new development.").
26. See Juby, supra note 17, at 1527.
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to incur debt without issuing general obligation bonds,27 which often
require a majority vote of citizens to pass.2 8
TIF began in 1952 in California, and today every state except
Arizona has adopted a TIF statute.2 9 TIF has become an oft-used
financing instrument in larger cities such as Chicago and San Diego,
but it has also been utilized in mid-sized cities like Gahanna, Ohio
and Kenosha, Wisconsin. 30 The use of TIF rose markedly after
decreases in federal funding for redevelopment-related activities
created an imperative for new, localized measures to address blight"
and stagnant development.32
TIF's proponents state several benefits justifying its use,
including the typical requirement that taxes raised within the TIF
district be devoted exclusively to improving elements within the
district.3 This use as a steering mechanism for funding in successful
districts is said to promote neighborhood stability and provide for
targeted development of a geographic area.34 Proponents also see TIF
as a way to address environmental problems (such as brownfields),s
to repurpose land whose previous use is now obsolete," and to spur
economic development." Some government finance officials prefer
TIF to other debt alternatives, in part because the tax increments
generate revenues via property value increases (rather than tax rate
27. See George Lefcoe, Competing for the Next Hundred Million Americans: The Uses
and Abuses of Tax Increment Financing, 43 URB. LAw. 427,438 (2011).
28. Id.
29. CDFA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 18, at 1.
30. Id.
31. The term "blight" is a specialized term within the land-use community. The
American Planning Association describes blight as having evolved from "grotesque living
conditions or deteriorated industrial areas" to "under-performing or obsolete land uses or
buildings that exist where the rational private investment cannot overcome market
forces." AM. PLANNING ASS'N, POLICY GUIDE ON PUBLIC REDEVELOPMENT 3 (2004),
http://www.planning.org/policy/guides/pdf/publicredevelopment.pdf. The definition of
blight is one that has changed significantly, as has the definition of "public use," to
facilitate increased use of TIF in some states. See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 14.
32. See CDFA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 18, at 3.
33. Id. at 2.
34. See id. at 3.
35. Id. at 5. Brownfields are typically geographically attractive parcels within city
limits, but because of decades of environmental abuse, they are unattractive to developers.
Id. TIFs are used to rehabilitate these areas, which often suffer from considerable
environmental degradation issues. Id.
36. See id. at 5-6 (describing a TIF project where a former military base was
converted into new residential and commercial facilities).
37. Id. at 6-8 (describing various economic development projects where TIF was used
to spur development, such as a $364.5 million project in Kansas City to attract the Internal
Revenue Service to place its headquarters there).
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increases), TIFs freeze property values at the time of adoption," and
TIFs allow local governments to finance infrastructure improvements
without placing a municipality's general fund (or full faith and credit
taxing authority) at risk. Proponents of TIF often point to many
stories of success in redeveloping land that previously had lain
dormant, or which contained environmental hazards that precluded
development. Examples of success are numerous, even in states that
have recently considered curtailing their use of TIF.4
TIF's critics, on the other hand, point to a mixed record of
success. 1 Additionally, in many states, TIF district debt generally
requires only the approval of a local government and is often issued
without a voter referendum.4 2 Consequently, TIEF is criticized for
issuing public debt without the public's approval.43 Some extend this
critique further, arguing that when publicly funded debt is issued for
economic development purposes (including TIF bonds used for such
a purpose), this action runs afoul of state constitutional provisions,
38. See id. at 2.
39. Id.
40. For example, two TIF districts in Chicago, the Homan Arlington TIF district and
the Stony Island TIF district, are widely viewed as successful developments and have
resulted in positive economic outcomes. See David S. Silverman, Illinois: TIF and the City
of Chicago, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 55, 67-71 (David Callies & W. Andrew
Gowder, Jr. eds., 2012). The Homan Arlington TIF district is a redevelopment of a former
Sears Roebuck and Company catalog building and administrative headquarters. Id. at 67.
By Chicago's estimate, the district has produced two dollars of private investment for
every one dollar of public assistance. Id. at 69. The Stony Island TIF district was targeted
at a large blighted area in Chicago. Id. at 67. Estimates posit that for every dollar of public
assistance, $5.20 in private investment has occurred. Id. at 71. California also has several
projects that are regarded as successes. See Matthew S. Gray & Cecily Barclay, California:
TIF and Community Development Law, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING, supra, at 37, 49-
50.
41. See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 9-10 (warning that "[TIF] is not a silver
bullet solution to development problems"); TIF Needs Limits to Protect Taxpayers,
MINNEAPOLIS ST. PAUL Bus. J. (July 1, 2001, 11:00 PM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2001/07/02/editoriall.htmi (critiquing a $62
million capital outlay from a municipality in Minnesota, while noting other successes in
Minnesota). For an example in North Carolina, see infra Part IV.A, which discusses the
Roanoke Rapids Theatre. The theatre provides an example of the dire financial straits a
town can find itself in if incremental increases in property taxes fall short of projections
and the town has limited capital reserves to shore up the larger gap. Id.
42. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1) ("The power of taxation shall be exercised in a
just and equitable manner, for public purposes only, and shall never be surrendered,
suspended, or contracted away."). But see id. § 14 (explaining that a local government may
pledge any additional securities besides the issuing local government's taxing power to
secure financing for development projects).
43. See Juby, supra note 17, at 1527 (explaining critics' concerns that "TIF options,
because they do not require voter approval, reduce the fiscal accountability of local
government officials and undercut basic democratic principles").
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although this notion was recently refuted in North Carolina." Critics
of TIF also allege that local governments provide only obscure
information to voters so that a typical citizen cannot determine
whether or not each TIF project is a net revenue producer.4 1 Still
other critics argue that modern TIF statutes do not reflect TIF's
original focus-urban renewal of blight-and point to TIF's use by
growing suburbs to lure jobs and residents away from inner-city
neighborhoods to areas with more financial stability. 6 This move
away from explicit blight requirements has led some to identify a
trend in states to "dispens[e] with the formal but somewhat
meaningless blight determination in favor of express recognition that
the process is really just about economic development."
TIEF has been used to subsidize retail development and to
increase flagging sales tax receipts in particular districts."5 Critics
contend that these sales tax increases merely displace sales tax
revenues from other areas, potentially creating a new blight problem
in place of the previous one.49 Further, successful TlFs typically
attract new residents while devoting significant property tax revenues
to repayment of debt service, causing a diversion of financial
44. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 729, 467 S.E.2d 615, 628
(1996) (stating that the legislature did not run "afoul" of constitutional limitations by
offering economic development incentives to businesses). Justice Robert Orr dissented in
Maready, stating that "little remains of the public purpose constitutional restraint on
governmental power to spend tax revenues collected from the public." Id. at 734, 467
S.E.2d at 631 (Orr, J., dissenting); see also N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2 ("The power of taxation
shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner, for public purposes only, and shall never
be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away."). Justice Orr later became the Executive
Director of the North Carolina Institute for Constitutional Law and helped lead an effort
to declare economic development incentives and other uses of public funds to attract
business as unconstitutional. See Richard Craver, Robert Orr Reflects on Battles Fought as
Head of N.C. Institute for Constitutional Law, SCNow.COM (Nov. 19, 2011),
http://www2.scnow.com/news/2011/nov/19/robert-orr-reflects-battles-fought-head-nc-
institu-ar-2725397/.
45. Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 428.
46. Id. at 427. In a specific example, two outdoor equipment providers, Bass Pro
Shops and Cabela's, were offered incentives to place large retail stores in two towns just
outside of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Louisiana: From the Big
Easy to the Suburbs, TIF and its Dangers, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING, supra note 40,
at 95,101--06. The suburban towns of Denham Springs and Gonzales lured the retail stores
by paying for the costs of building construction and giving the corporations the option to
purchase these facilities for "nominal" fees. Id. at 107.
47. H. Lawrence Hoyt, What's the "TIF" All About?, in TAX INCREMENT
FINANCING, supra note 40, at 3, 21-22.
48. See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 9-10; TIF Needs Limits to Protect
Taxpayers, supra note 41 (critiquing a $62 million capital outlay from a municipality in
Minnesota, while noting other successes in Minnesota).
49. Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 427.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
resources that can put a strain on schools and other local agencies
having to meet the increased demand for services without additional
property tax revenues needed to address these new demands.so
Agencies administering TIF also experience strain from the
complicated structure of the project, as TIF tends to involve "an
extensive, long-term, and costly administrative effort."" Lastly,
commentators argue that governments have been overzealous in
dispensing TIFss2 and other economic development devices, at least
in proportion to the economic benefits they create. 3 These and other
critiques have led some-including California Governor Jerry
Brown 54-to call for the elimination of TIF, or, alternatively, for
significant reformation of TIF statutes.
II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TIF STATUTES
This Part analyzes how different states have modified TIF
statutes to fit their unique needs. To establish a baseline of statutory
features, this Part first discusses the American Planning Association's
model TIF statute. Next, this Part categorizes states as "aggressive"
or "conservative" based on the frequency of TIF use. This Part
ultimately lays the groundwork to compare the various statutory
features of the considered state statutes to North Carolina's TIF
statute in Part III, which would be classified as conservatively used
under the aforementioned rubric. 6 The ultimate goal of this
comparative statutory analysis is to diagnose whether North
Carolina's sparse use of TIF can be attributed to statutory
construction, ancillary factors, or a combination of both.
50. Id.
51. Craig L. Johnson & Kenneth A. Kriz, A Review of State Tax Increment Financing
Laws, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES,
STRUCTURES, AND IMPACT 31,.32 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001).
52. Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 427.
53. See, e.g., Jeanette Doran, Economic Development Incentives-Questionable
Efficacy and Constitutional Infirmity, N.C. INST. FOR CONST. L. (Mar. 22, 2011),
http://ncicl.org/article/592 (arguing that economic development incentives are
"ineffective[] ... at achieving the purported benefits of job creation and economic
stimulation").
54. See Randal O'Toole, Crony Capitalism and Social Engineering: The Case Against
Tax-Increment Financing, 676 POL'Y ANALYSIS 1, 13 (May 18, 2011),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA676.pdf.
55. Id. (arguing that local governments should narrow the definition of "blight,"
redefine TIF formulas to ensure a more narrow definition of tax revenue increments,
allow opt-out provisions for overlapping tax entities, and require a public vote to create or
extend a TIF district).
56. See infra Part IV (noting that North Carolina has approved three TIF projects, but
that only two have been undertaken).
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A. Model TIF Statute: Basic Structural Requirements and Flexibility
In an effort to standardize TIF statutes, the American Planning
Association developed a model TIF statute based on features from
TIF statutes around the nation." One central item is a provision
requiring TIF bonds to be linked to the broader redevelopment
program they are intended to finance." Additionally, the model TIF
statute requires that a redevelopment area plan and ordinance be in
place before a TIF ordinance is established." The mandatory TIF
ordinance also must include a citation to the enabling redevelopment
plan ordinance, a statement of consistency with the redevelopment
plan, a description of the limits and boundaries of the redevelopment
area, and a procedure to review the determination of property tax
increments." There are also provisions to ensure that tax assessors
are kept apprised of the TIF district's status"1 and that the assessors
create a base valuation for the TIF district.62 Lastly, the model statute
creates a special account to collect tax increment revenues and to
distribute these funds when the TIF district's redevelopment activities
end.63
The model TIF statute, however, includes several options for
varying the statute, which highlight the diversity of states' TIF
statutes and the lack of a uniformly accepted "best practice" for
implementing TIF. The model statute allows for an optional "but-for"
test to ensure that TIF is a necessary condition for property
redevelopment (or that property would not be redeveloped "but for"
the TIF)." The statute does not prescribe how TIEF funds are to be
spent, leaving that decision to the TIF plan and the redevelopment
area ordinance implementing the plan. 5 The statute also allows
57. See AM. PLANNING ASS'N, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK:
MODEL STATUTES FOR PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE, at 14-55 to 14-
56 (2002).
58. See id. § 14-302(2), at 14-57.
59. Id. § 14-302(4)(a), at 14-58.
60. Id. § 14-302(5), at 14-59.
61. Id. § 14-302(7), at 14-60.
62. Id. § 14-302(8), at 14-60 to 14-61.
63. Id. § 14-302(10), at 14-61 to 14-62 (providing that the funds should be
redistributed to an individual taxing unit's general fund-where sales and property tax
revenues normally matriculate-and distributed pro rata when applied to multiple taxing
units).
64. Id. § 14-302(4)(b), at 14-58. For an explanation of the but-for test employed in TIF
statutes, see Reinert, supra note 21, at 1034. The Model TIF Statute authors, in their
preface, note a lack of consensus on the but-for requirement and leave the but-for
provision as an optional item for legislators. See AM. PLANNING ASS'N, supra note 57, at
14-56.
65. AM. PLANNING ASS'N, supra note 57, at 14-56.
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flexibility in determining how the TIF district will be financed,
including an option to use sales taxes, rather than property taxes, in a
TIF project,66 as well as an option to create either a district where all
new property taxes are devoted to the TIF district or a district where
only additional property tax increments for a specific layer of local
government are included in the calculation.'
Ultimately, the model TIF statute is a fairly flexible instrument
with two key features: the requirement of both a development plan
and a local ordinance before a TIF ordinance may be passed," and
the requirement of a separate accounting fund for TIF proceeds.6 9
While illustrative of a few various components of TIF statutory
construction, the model TIF statute does not identify which of its
features are more likely to facilitate additional use of TIF, or which
provisions discourage increased use, if any. Deliberate consideration
of other states' practices may provide insight into those features and
are considered in Parts ILA and II.B. The states examined are
grouped by the frequency with which TIEFs have been used to provide
greater insights into which statutory features inhibit or promote TIF
use.
B. Aggressively Used TIF Statutes
The use of TIF varies considerably by state, as does reporting of
its use. While there is not a uniform system of reporting when a TIF
district is established, 0 there are discernible trends showing that some
states have created considerably more TIF districts than others. These
states can be categorized as "aggressive" users of TIF.7 This Section
considers the TIF statutes of several states that have used TIF
aggressively in hopes of identifying common trends between their
statutory structures.
66. Id. § 14-302(6), at 14-59 to 14-60.
67. See id. at 14-56.
68. Id. § 14-302(4), at 14-58.
69. Id. § 14-302(10), at 14-61 to 14-62.
70. At least one publication has produced a study identifying the number of TIF
districts by state. Jennifer Petersen, The State of Tax Increment Financing in the United
States, 45 ST. TAX NOTES MAG. 601, 602-03 (Aug. 27, 2007).
71. Id. (showing California (771 districts), Illinois (1,000 districts), Iowa (949 districts),
Minnesota (2,184 districts), Ohio (747 districts), and Wisconsin (818 districts) as having
the largest number of TIF districts). These states and their statutory frameworks will be
used in this Comment's consideration of "aggressively" used TIF statutes. See infra Part
II.B.1-II.B.3.
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1. California: The First State and Its Struggles with TIF
California, the first state to use TIF,7 2 has used TIF aggressively
since it passed its TIF legislation in 1952.73 California's statute has
several distinctive features, although drastic changes were made to
the statute in 2011.'' These changes were affirmed by the California
Supreme Court,"7 and the state dissolved all 400 redevelopment
agencies as of February 1, 2012.6 Regardless, consideration of the
original and oft-used TIF statute will prove valuable for the analysis
of North Carolina's statute. California's TIF statute, which was
embedded within a larger statute for community redevelopment,
defined the state's TIF structure similarly to the model TIF statute.
California's statute only allowed TIF where it was necessary for
effective redevelopment, employed the "but-for" approach," but was
unique in requiring that TIF-eligible redevelopment areas be
predominantly "blighted." 9 The blighted areas within a TIF zone did
not need to be contiguous and could include some non-blighted areas
that were necessary for effective redevelopment.so California also
used a fifty-year maximum lifespan for the TIF district," required a
72. See CDFA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 18, at 1.
73. California had approximately 771 TIF districts as of 2007. See Petersen, supra note
70, at 602.
74. See Gray & Barclay, supra note 40, at 50 (discussing California Governor Jerry
Brown's proposals to disband all redevelopment agencies in the state).
75. Cal. Redevelopment Ass'n v. Matosantos, 267 P.3d 580, 588 (Cal. 2011) (affirming
the redevelopment legislation).
76. Transition of Redevelopment Agency to City and County of San Francisco, S.F.
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, http://www.sfredevelopment.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
77. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33670 (West 1999) (providing that public
entities, other than the redevelopment authority, are entitled to receive property tax
revenues for the assessed property value prior to the effective date of the redevelopment
plan, with the increments being allocated to the redevelopment authority to repay the
earlier issued debt). Further, the California statute allows the traditional debt financing
from tax increments and also requires that the property tax revenues be held in a special
fund to repay bonds issued under TIF. Id. § 33670(b).
78. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33037 (West 2010) (stating that the purpose of
the statute is "[t]o protect and promote the sound development and redevelopment of
blighted areas ... by remedying such injurious conditions through the employment of all
appropriate means").
79. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012) (providing
a statutory definition of blight in California). Prior to 1993, California did not define blight
by statute, and there were myriad court decisions struggling with the definition of blight.
See Jeff Chapman, Tax Increment Financing and Fiscal Stress: The California Genesis, in
TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND
IMPACTS, supra note 51, at 113,114-15.
80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33320.2 (West 2010).
81. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33776 (West 1999) (stating that revenue bonds
issued in the TIF district may not have a longer maturity date than fifty years).
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redevelopment plan, 2 and, if the development involved the exercise
of eminent domain, the TIF district could not be in effect longer than
twelve years.8 Further, California required that at least twenty
percent of the increment revenue be spent on low- and moderate-
income housing for displaced residents, unless such housing needs
were already being met elsewhere.'
California has a long history of battles between local government
entities for tax increment revenues-notably between school districts
and redevelopment agencies.15 Prior to reforms in 1994, school
districts had to negotiate for a piece of the incremental tax revenues,
but thereafter a mandatory formula was created to standardize the
incremental amounts school districts received from the
redevelopment authority." Indeed, critics of TIF argued that it was
sometimes "misused to subsidize a city's economic development
through the diversion of property tax revenues from other taxing
entities."" The use of TIF by redevelopment agencies allowed small
cities in blighted areas to "shield virtually all of their property tax
revenue from other government agencies" and tempted those
agencies to use redevelopment as a financial weapon to divert
property taxes away from other governmental unitsM As a result of
the statutory authority they wielded, redevelopment agencies were
able to garner twelve percent of all property tax revenues in
California by 2011.
82. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33330 (West 2010) (requiring a development
agency to create a redevelopment plan and to consult with the community's planning
commission and-if applicable-a project area committee).
83. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33492.85(b)(2) (West 1999).
84. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33334.6 (West 2010) (requiring that "not less
than 20 percent of [all] taxes allocated to the agency" be used for a "Low Income and
Moderate Housing Fund"); see also id. § 33492.16 (allowing for a deferment of the
requirement to allocate twenty percent of TIF proceeds to the Low and Moderate Income
Housing Fund).
85. See Chapman, supra note 79, at 130 (describing the complexity of the negotiations
between school districts and redevelopment agencies).
86. See id.
87. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency v. Dibley, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593, 594 (Ct. App.
1993).
88. WILLIAM B. FULTON & PAUL SHIGLEY, GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA PLANNING 263-
64 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that "redevelopment proved to be one of the most powerful
mechanisms for gaining an advantage" over other local government entities vying for
property tax funds).
89. See Marriane O'Malley & Mark Whitaker, The 2011-12 Budget: Should California




Despite the sophistication of its statute and its various provisions
designed to protect against abuse, California enacted major structural
changes to its TIEF statute.'o Recently passed legislation9' and court
decisions will enact such significant changes to the state's
redevelopment statute that the California Redevelopment
Association (a TIF trade organization) says the legislation has
"abolished" redevelopment in California. 92 The legislation winds
down the existence of redevelopment agencies, which administered
TIF in the state.93 The California Supreme Court upheld the
legislation to wind down redevelopment agencies, and also struck
down a compromise provision in a separate bill to allow the agencies
to continue operating if they made payments to help aid in funding
traditional government services.94 Today, absent future legislative
intervention, the state that invented TIF will no longer allow its use
for any future development projects.9 s
2. Illinois: Another Model State Considering Reform
Illinois has also utilized TIF extensively,96 so much so that former
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley took to calling TIF "the only game in
town." Illinois's statute has had wide influence in other states and
90. See id. (recommending that California's state legislature follow a modified version
of Governor Jerry Brown's proposal to end California's redevelopment program and
instead offer local governments alternative tools to finance economic development, since
dissolution of redevelopment agencies would provide for additional state control of
economic development initiatives and increase local governments' flexibility in spending
property tax revenues).
91. See 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 5 (A.B.X1-26) (West); id ch. 6
(A.B.X1-27).
92. Supreme Court Announces Decision in CRA v. Matosantos, CAL.
REDEVELOPMENT ASS'N (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.calredevelop.org/External
/WCPages/WCWebContent/WebContentPage.aspx?ContentlD=1891.
93. See Gray & Barclay, supra note 40, at 50 (discussing two pieces of California
legislation, Assembly Bill 1X26 and 1X27, which were passed in response to Governor
Jerry Brown's promise to abolish redevelopment agencies in the state).
94. Cal. Redevelopment Ass'n v. Matosantos, 267 P.3d 580, 588 (Cal. 2011) (affirming
California's recent legislation forbidding redevelopment agencies from engaging in new
business and providing for their windup and dissolution, and overturning a second bill that
would allow for new business if certain payments were authorized).
95. The effects of this decision may be far-reaching, with some arguing that "[tlhe end
of redevelopment in California may have ripple effects on other states' redevelopment
programs." Gray & Barclay, supra note 40, at 53. Further legal challenges may arise
around issues such as the enforceability of contract obligations incurred by former
redevelopment agencies and the liabilities and powers of their successors. Id.
96. Illinois had an estimated 1,000 TIF districts as of 2007. Petersen, supra note 70, at
602.
97. Briffault, supra note 22, at 65-66.
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served as the model for TIF statutes in Missouri and South Carolina."
Like California's statute, the Illinois statute utilizes a blight
requirement for TIEF, 9 but also allows TIF for "conservation areas,"
defined as areas where at least half the housing is over thirty-five
years old, is not currently blighted, but may become blighted because
of several factors.'" These are the two most common forms of
qualifying an area as a TIEF district"o' and require that a number of the
statutorily enumerated factors be met before a TIF district is
approved. "
The Illinois statute requires that the properties be contiguous, 0o
that a redevelopment plan be produced,""' and that property owners
in a proposed TIF district be provided notice and a hearing. 05
Another procedural protection is the potential requirement of a
feasibility analysis. A feasibility analysis is not always required; it
becomes required when a TIF district creates a displacement of ten or
more residential units. 0 6 Illinois imposes a time limit of thirty-five
years for the TIF district, a shorter period than California's fifty-year
maximum,'07 and allows for the acquisition of land in the
redevelopment area via purchase, donation, lease, or eminent
domain. 08 Illinois' TIF statute creates a special fund to hold the TIF
proceeds, which are then applied to pay off the issued bonds," 9 and
allows municipalities to create a commission to govern the
98. See AM. PLANNING AS'N, supra note 57, at 14-54.
99. 65 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-74.4-3(a) (West Supp. 2012) (enumerating
several factors contributing to blight, including dilapidation, obsolescence, building
deterioration, excessive vacancies, and environmentally hazardous conditions, among
others).
100. Id. § 5/11-74.4-3(b) (listing similar blighting factors, three or more of which
combine to create the presumption that the conservation area will become a blighted
area).
101. See Silverman, supra note 40, at 60-61.
102. § 5/11-74.4-3 (requiring at least five of thirteen factors be present to qualify an
area as "blighted," and at least three of thirteen factors be present to create a
"conservation area").
103. Id. § 5/11-74.4-4(a). The Illinois statutes also allow for a transfer of funds between
contiguous TIF districts. See id. § 5/11-74.4-4(q).
104. 65 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-74.4-4.1 (West 2005) (outlining the requirements
of the "feasibility study," which includes the boundaries of the redevelopment project
area, the purpose of the plan and project, and a description of the TIF to be used).
105. 65 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-74.4-6 (West Supp. 2012).
106. 65 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-74.4-4.1(b) (West 2005).
107. 65 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-74.4-3.5(e) (West Supp. 2012).
108. Id, § 5/11-74.4-4(c).
109. Id. § 5/11-74.4-4.8(b) (describing characteristics of the "special tax allocation
fund").
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redevelopment area.110 The statute further allows the use of other tax
revenues to secure the debt-including the full faith and credit of the
local governmental unit.i" However, sales tax revenues may not be
pledged under Illinois' regime.112
Similar to California, Illinois' use of TIF has come under heavy
criticism in recent years. This criticism led to the creation of a task
force by Mayor Rahm Emmanuel to recommend changes to TIF use
in Chicago, where former Mayor Richard Daley allegedly used TIF
extensively to subsidize several private developments." 3 Statewide
TIF reform has been discussed-including promulgating new rules
that would require training for municipal employees who administer
TIFs, filing of annual TIF reports by municipalities to the state,
establishing a thirty-five percent cap on total municipal land within
TIF districts, eliminating transfers of funds between contiguous
districts, and linking the maturity of TIF bonds with the TIF district's
110. Id. § 5/11-74.4-4(k) (describing a permissible commission consisting of between
five and fifteen people-"appointed by the mayor or president of the municipality with
the consent of the majority of [its] governing board"-who can exercise power over the
redevelopment area, hold public hearings, and act with approval of the governing body or
authorizing agent).
111. Id. § 5/11-74.4-7 (stating that "in addition to obligations secured by the special tax
allocation fund," the "municipality may .. .pledge ... (a) net revenues of all or part of any
redevelopment project; (b) taxes levied and collected on any or all property in the
municipality; (c) the full faith and credit of the municipality; (d) a mortgage on part or all
of the redevelopment project; or (e) any other taxes or anticipated receipts that the
municipality may lawfully pledge").
112. See Silverman, supra note 40, at 59 (noting a 1987 statutory change that removed
the authority of Illinois municipalities to pledge sales tax revenues).
113. See How to Salvage City's TIF Program, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2, 2011, at 43
(describing Daley's "paper[ing of] a third of the city with TIF districts," citizens' anger
with TIF, and a move by current Mayor Rahm Emanuel to increase planning, oversight,
accountability, and transparency of the TIF process). But see Juan-Pablo Velez, TIFAided
Public and Private Projects Almost Evenly, Analysis Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/us/07cnctif.html? (citing analysis by the Chicago News
Cooperative finding that "TIF spending was allocated almost evenly between public works
and subsidies for private interests"). Mayor Emmanuel's task force produced a report
which suggested Mayor Emmanuel produce a multi-year economic development plan, to
create a multi-year capital financing budget, to create metrics for TIF's performance in
Chicago, and to create a governing organization within Chicago with "clear accountability
for all aspects of TIF" and a staff to provide oversight. See TIF REFORM PANEL,
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORMING THE USE OF TAX INCREMENT
FINANCING IN CHICAGO: CREATING GREATER EFFICIENCY, TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 3-4 (2011), http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts
/mayor/Press%2ORoom/Press%20Releases/2011/August/8.29.11TIFReport.pdf. Presently,
it appears that the reforms to TIF in Chicago have stalled. Matthew Blake, TIF Reform
Tabled, PROGRESS ILL. (June 4, 2012), http://progressillinois.com/posts
/content/2012/06/04/tif-reform-tabled.
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lifespan.114 This legislation,"' and other pieces of legislation
attempting to reform Illinois' TIF reporting scheme,116 have not
passed to date.
3. Other Aggressive States' Use of TIF: Variance in Blight, "But-
For," Land-Use, and More
California and Illinois are not the only aggressive users of TIF, "
but are perhaps the states whose use of the instrument has attracted
the most attention. Other aggressive users of TIF have statutes
structured quite differently than either of the two statutes discussed
above. For instance, some states, such as Iowa, have broadly defined
and lenient TIF statutes." 8 In Iowa, municipal governments declare
their TIF districts unilaterally" 9 and are granted considerable powers
114. See generally S.B. 0540, 97th Leg. (Ill. 2011) (making various revisions to the
Illinois TIF statute); Megan Cottrell, Three Days Left for TIF Reform in the Veto Session,
CHI. REP. (Nov. 8, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://www.chicagonow.com/chicago-
muckrakers/2011/11/three-days-left-for-tif-reform-in-the-veto-session/ (describing
components of the proposed TIF legislation and arguing for legislators to support the
provisions). The contiguous TIF transfer provision was designed to require that two
adjacent or overlapping TIF districts, before transferring funds between one another,
show that both TIF districts would benefit from the transfer of funds. See id. Other TIF
reforms suggested in Illinois include printing all TIF districts on Illinois tax bills and
describing the specifies of how the TIF districts are being funded. See KATE PIERCEY, ILL.
POLICY INST., POLICY BRIEF: TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 4 (2010),
http://illinoispolicy.org/uploads/files/TIF10-12.pdf. Additional suggestions include
disclosing all parties involved in a TIF, including vendors and the party that authorized the
TIF, as well as requiring a public vote to authorize new TIFs and a stricter blight
definition. Id.
115. Bill Status of SBO540, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=540&GAID=11&DocTypelD=SB
&SessionlD=84&GA=97 (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
116. Bill Status of HB5457, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=5457&GAID=11&DocTypelD=H
B&Legld=65752&SessionlD=84 (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). For an advocate's viewpoint
of the legislation, see J. Thomas Johnson, TIF Reform, CHI. TRIB. (May 23, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-23/news/chi-120523johnson_briefs_1_tif-reform-
tax-increment-financing-districts-property-tax (advocating for passage of stricter reporting
requirements of spending TIF funds).
117. As of 2007, California actually had fewer TIF districts than Iowa, which had 949,
and Illinois had fewer TIF districts than Minnesota, which had 2,184. See Petersen, supra
note 70, at 602.
118. See Dave Swenson & Liesl Eathington, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING GROWTH IN
IOWA 1 (April 2006), http://www.econ.iastate.edu/research/webpapers/paper-12586.pdf.
119. See id.; see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.5(1) (West Supp. 2012) (allowing the
municipality to declare an urban renewal project if it determines the area is "a slum area,
blighted area, economic development area, or a combination of those areas" and
designates the area "appropriate for an urban renewal project").
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to achieve the goals of the urban renewal district. 20 One such power
is a recently enacted provision allowing for a local-option sales tax
that can be levied by municipalities to be included within TIFs.11"
Moreover, Iowa does not employ a blight requirement or use a "but-
for test" in determining whether to authorize TIF. 22 Iowa's TIF
statute provides an example of a fairly deregulated statute, in contrast
to the California and Illinois statutes, which have more specific
provisions and regulations attached to their use.
Aggressively used TIF statutes also employ various means of
determining the district lifespans, governing authorities, and financing
mechanisms. Most of the aggressive states use sunset provisions for
the TIF district in the twenty- to thirty-year span, although some
simply do not specify a shelf life for TIF districts or specify several
different time limits based on the type of development activity.123
Some statutes create different types of development authorities for
different types of projects. These can include TIFs to finance school
development, brownfield development, downtown development
authorities, and other project-specific development authorities.124
120. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.6 (West Supp. 2012) (allowing municipalities "all the
powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate the purposes and provisions"
of the urban renewal project statute, including the ability to acquire land via purchase,
lease, or eminent domain, and to approve urban renewal plans).
121. IOWA CODE ANN. § 423B.1(6)(c) (West 2011); A Step Backward in TIF Reform,
IOWA POL'Y PROJECT (May 21, 2008), http://www.iowapolicyproject.org/TIF.html.
122. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.5(1) (West Supp. 2012).
123. See id. § 403.17(10) (prescribing a maximum of twenty years for a TIF district in
Iowa); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.2915 (West Supp. 2012) (prescribing a duration of
thirty years, but allowing the governing body to extend the duration by resolution); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 99.835 (West 2008) (prescribing a twenty-three-year limit); OH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 5709.41 (LexisNexis 2011) (providing for a maximum of thirty years). Minnesota
has a number of different time limits based on the type of TIF district. For example, an
"economic development district's" lifespan is limited to eight years from the receipt of the
first tax increment. MINN. STAT, ANN. § 469.176 subd. lb (West Supp. 2012).
Redevelopment and housing districts, on the other hand, may have a duration of twenty-
five years from receipt of the first tax increment. Id. Minnesota also uses what it calls the
five-year rule, which requires development activity for a TIF district to be finished within
five years. Id. § 469.1763 subd. 3. From the beginning of the sixth year forward, tax
increments can only be used to pay off debt incurred to fund the work during the five-year
period. Id. H§ 469.1763 subd. 4, 469.177 subd. 12(4). For a summary of Minnesota's
different types of TIF districts, see TIF District Types: Applicable Limits and
Characteristics, MINN. H.R. (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd
/issinfo/tifdist.htm. Wisconsin also provides for a number of different time limits for TIF
districts, ranging between twenty-three and twenty-seven years, depending on
development type. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 66.1105(7) (West Supp. 2011).
124. See Laura M. Bassett, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for Redevelopment:
Attracting Private Investment to Serve a Public Purpose-The Example of Michigan, 41
URB. LAW. 755, 757-58 (2009) (describing Michigan's different types of TIF authorities,
including Downtown Development Authorities, a Local Development Financing
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Aggressive statutes also vary in their allowance of additional pledged
securities: some allow for the use of any publicly-available security to
finance the debt incurred from the TIF bonds,'" while others
constrict more narrowly the specific types of securities that may be
used to pay down the issued debt."6 Few states in the aggressively-
utilized category allow for sales taxes as a base revenue source for a
TIEF; most opt for the traditional model of a property tax-based TIF
instead.127
Some aggressively used TIF statutes also employ the "but-for"
test,'2 8 as well as blight requirements. The blighting requirement
varies between states, although aggressively used TIF statutes seem to
frequently provide for other uses of TIF beyond blight reduction.
Minnesota's TIF statute, for example, provides an array of options
beyond simply addressing blight-such as the ability to use TIF in
certain "redevelopment districts," "housing districts," and "economic
development districts." 29 Use of TIF for purposes other than
redevelopment of blighted areas (such as economic development) has
been met with criticism, as some consider these uses misaligned with
the public redevelopment purpose originally envisioned for TIF
districts.'" To address these criticisms, some states have taken
Authorities, Corridor Improvement Authorities, Neighborhood Improvement
Authorities, Water Resource Improvement Districts, and Brownfield Redevelopment
Authorities).
125. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.178 (West Supp. 2012) (allowing for the use of
general obligation bonds from the municipality and the TIF authority, revenue bonds,
temporary bonds, as well as "interfund loans," which allow transfers from a government's
general fund to the TIF district). However, while a wide range of financing may be
available to fund TIF districts, increment funds cannot be used for general governmental
purposes. See id. § 469.178 subd. 4.
126. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 125.1811, 125.1815(2) (West 2006)
(allowing the municipality to pledge its full faith and credit by majority vote and to issue
tax increment bonds, revenue bonds, and other sources of local income).
127. Of the states included in the "aggressively used" TIF category, both Iowa and
Illinois allow for sales tax TIF districts. See 65 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-74.4-3(h)
(West Supp. 2012) (defining the "Municipal Sales Tax Revenue Increment" as "an amount
equal to the increase in the aggregate amount of taxes paid to a municipality from the
Local Government Tax fund arising from sales by retailers"); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 423B.1(6)(c), 423B.10(2) (West 2011) (allowing for local option sales taxes to be used,
without a ballot provision, in TIF districts).
128. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.175, subd. 3 (West Supp. 2012) (stating that the
municipality must make the but-for finding before approving the TIF plan); see also id.
§ 469.175, subd. 7(b) (stating that for hazardous substance subdistricts, the development
authority must make a but-for finding).
129. See id. § 469.174, subd. 10-12 (providing descriptions and eligibility requirements
for the different available districts).
130. See, e.g., Alyson Tomme, Note, Tax Increment Financing: Public Use or Private
Abuse?, 90 MINN. L. REv. 213, 213-15 (2005) (describing a TIF deal in Minnesota which
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remedial measures to give preference to redevelopment of blight,
with mixed results.' 3 1
Some aggressively used statutes also require intergovernmental
notifications prior to TIF issuance. Ohio's statute, for example,
addresses property tax assessment issues TIF may create and the
potential harms they might cause to other governmental units. In
Ohio, a school district affected by a TIF must be notified of the TIF's
creation. 3 2 If the school district does not approve the TIF, a payment
must be made to the school district in lieu of taxes.13 Ohio also
requires that a TIF district be created by ordinance and that the
ordinance be filed with the state Department of Development. 34
Annual status report filings with that department are required,3 s
which is not a feature of many other aggressively used TIEF statutes.
As discussed in this Section, aggressively used TIEF statutes have
a wide variety of different features, but there does not appear to be a
common thread that binds the aggressive states together in their
heightened use of TIFs. However, a trend does become apparent
when one compares aggressive TIF users with conservative TIF users
specifically; unlike conservative TIF users, most aggressive users do
not include within their statutes any requirement for
intergovernmental notification and approval.
required a significant amount of land to be condemned and seized through eminent
domain for the "public use" of housing Best Buy's corporate headquarters).
131. In Wisconsin, for example, tax increments may only be used in a district if one of
three conditions applies: (1) the project costs are used to provide low-income housing or
environmental rehabilitation; (2) at least fifty percent of the area is blighted; or (3) the
recipient district is a mixed-use or industrial use district deemed distressed or severely
distressed. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.1105 (West Supp. 2011). However, at least in
Wisconsin, these blight-alleviation requirements have not been consistently enforced, with
TIF districts being created in recent years in non-blighted areas such as farmland. See
David N. Farwell, A Modest Proposal: Eliminating Blight, Abolishing But-For, and Putting
New Purpose in Wisconsin's Tax Increment Financing Law, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 407,408-09
(2005) (arguing that TIF in Wisconsin has "evolved into a tool for municipalities to control
the pace and direction of development as much as it is a tool of blight elimination").
132. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1728.10(A) (LexisNexis 2009).
133. Id. The school district and the local government can also enter into agreements
exempting a percentage of the assessed valuation. Id.
134. Id. § 1728.01(C)(1)(b).
135. Id. §§ 5709.40(I), 5709.41(E), 5709.73(I), 5709.78(H).
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C. Conservatively Used TIF Statutes: Variance Again, with
Intergovernmental Notice
There are several states that can be categorized as having used
TIF conservatively or moderately."' These states' statutes have many
of the same characteristics as the model statute and the aggressively
used statutes, such as allowing for a broader range of tax revenue
sources than simple property tax increments.' 7 Conservative states
also have varied lifespans for TIF districts.'
Blight requirements are also similarly mixed. For example,
Missouri's blighting requirement has been joined by conservation and
economic development purposes,13 while other conservative states
have described appropriate blight conditions more stringently. 140
136. See Petersen, supra note 70, at 602-03 (showing Connecticut (less than five
districts), Massachusetts (two districts), New Jersey (zero districts), Virginia (three
districts), and Alaska (zero districts) as having a smaller number of TIF statutes). Missouri
(263) and South Carolina (100) both have a middling number of authorized TIF districts,
id., and will therefore be included in this analysis as moderate TIF users.
137. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 99.845 (West 2011) (allowing for a broad array of tax
sources, including property tax, sales tax, and an "economic activities" tax). Thirteen
states and the District of Columbia allow for non-property taxes to be utilized in paying
development costs through sales tax increments, income tax increments, or non-property
taxes that are coupled with property taxes in the tax increment. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 31-25-107(9) (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-285(c) (West Supp. 2012); D.C. CODE
§ 2-1217.05 (2007); IND. CODE ANN. H§ 36-7-26-10, 36-7-27-8 (LexisNexis 2009); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 33:9033.3 (Supp. 2012), 33:9038.34 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36,
§ 6753 (2010); MIss. CODE ANN. § 21-45-7 (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 99.845 (West
2008); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-469 (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 861 (West
2010); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6930.3 (West 2011); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 311.012-
.0123 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17C-1-409 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15-9-207 (2011). Indiana and Louisiana are the only two states that
allow for a sales tax increment regime that is entirely divorced from a traditional property
tax increment regime. Lauren Ashley Smith, Note, Alternatives to Property Tax Increment
Finance Programs: Sales, Income, and Nonproperty Tax Increment Financing, 41 URB.
LAw. 705, 707 (2009).
138. South Carolina provides an example of this variance. It does not prescribe a
maximum length for the TIF district, but does set a limit of thirty years for issued debt in
the TIF district. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-40, 31-7-40 (2007). South Carolina also limits the
amount of time local governments have to issue debt from the date of the authorizing TIF
ordinance: counties have five years, id. § 31-7-70, while cities have ten. Id. § 31-6-70.
139. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 99.845 (West 2011) (allowing eligibility for TIF to blighted
areas located either in "enterprise zones" or "federal empowerment zones, ... provided
that the [zonel contained one or more buildings at least fifty years old and ... [sjuffered
from generally declining population or property taxes"); Harold L. Lowenstein,
Redevelopment Condemnations: a Blight or a Blessing upon the Land?, 74 MO. L. REV.
301, 302-03 (2009) (noting that while TIF was initially designed to only address blighted
neighborhoods, the financing instrument has grown to be viewed by developers as an
integral part of development projects).
140. South Carolina's definition of "blight" has several provisions and considers
several factors:
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Virginia employed a broader approach prior to 2006, allowing TIF to
be used to "promote ... commerce and prosperity" in any area
designated by a local government.14 ' Virginia's statute has since been
reformed to provide specific examples of public purposes for which
TIF may be used.14 2
While conservatively used TIF statutes share trends with their
more aggressively used counterparts in other states, they also exhibit
distinct traits. Perhaps the most pronounced difference is that many
states with conservatively used TIF statutes tend to require state
approval of a local government's plan to use TIF. Connecticut's
statute, for example, requires approval by a joint committee of the
Connecticut General Assembly for the use of several types of taxes in
TIF districts, 43 although the state does not require approval by the
General Assembly for a traditional property tax TIF project.1"
Further, Connecticut requires approval by its State Bond Commission
before any debt is issued for a TIF district.'45 Massachusetts, however,
mandates a higher level of state involvement, requiring state approval
for all TIF plans by a state "council," an annual status report to a
state agency (including all properties acquired by eminent domain),
updates of district costs and financing, the status of the TIF for the
"Blighted area" means any improved or vacant area where if improved, industrial,
commercial, and residential buildings or improvements, because of a combination
of five or more of the following factors: age; dilapidation; obsolescence;
deterioration; illegal use of individual structures; presence of structures below
minimum code standards; excessive vacancies; overcrowding of structures and
community facilities; lack of ventilation, light, or sanitary facilities; inadequate
utilities; excessive land coverage; deleterious land use or layout; depreciation of
physical maintenance; lack of community planning, are detrimental to the public
safety, health, morals, or welfare or, if vacant, the sound growth is impaired by (a)
a combination of two or more of the following factors: obsolete platting of the
vacant land; diversity of ownership of such land; tax and special assessment
delinquencies on such land; deterioration of structures or site improvements in
neighboring areas adjacent to the vacant land; or (b) the area immediately prior to
becoming vacant qualified as a blighted area.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-10-20(2) (2007).
141. Act of Mar. 17, 1999, 1999 Va. Acts 190 (amended 2006).
142. Act of Apr. 6, 2006, 2006 Va. Acts 784 (removing the "commerce and prosperity"
language and listing roads, water, sewers, parks, and real estate as examples of
improvements that may be made to help eliminate blighted conditions).
143. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-285(f)(6) (West Supp. 2012) (including incremental
sales, hotel, cabaret, dues, and admissions taxes for use in a TIF district).
144. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-134a (West 2010) (vesting TIF oversight in either
the relevant municipality or the Connecticut Development Authority).
145. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-285(g)(2) (West 2010 & Supp. 2012).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
program, and a schedule of the program going forward. 14 6 New
Jersey's statute similarly requires approval from a state commission
before proceeding with a TIF project.'4 7
Although the conservatively used TIF statutes require some form
of notice or state approval for TIF districts, not all of them require
approval from a statewide body." Further, some conservatively used
statutes provide broad grants of authority that more closely parallel
their aggressive counterparts.'4 9 For example, Alaska, which allows
myriad financing options, requires oversight only from the
municipality, does not require public hearings for the TIF, and does
not make qualifications for the types of projects that are eligible. 5
Despite this lenity, Alaska has not had a TIF district declared since
the establishment of the statute in 1988.1s'
III. TIF IN NORTH CAROLINA
In terms of use, North Carolina can be squarely categorized with
states that use their TIF statutes conservatively, with only three
approvals of its use and two total TIF districts in the state.'
Regardless, lessons can be drawn from a comparison of the statutory
structure of TIF in North Carolina with the model statute, aggressive
users of TIF, and conservative users of TIF to determine whether the
infrequency of its use is attributable to the statutory structure,
environmental determinants, available substitutes, or some
combination of these factors. This Part first presents the history of
TIF legislation in North Carolina, then describes the elements of
North Carolina's statute in detail, and finally compares elements of
North Carolina's statute to each category to document the similarities
and differences across categories of TIF users.
A. History of TIF Legislation in North Carolina
There were several attempts to pass authorizing legislation and
constitutional amendments to allow TIF in North Carolina prior to
146. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40, § 59(vii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); 402 MASS. CODE
REGS. 3.12 (2012).
147. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-460 (West 2010).
148. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
149. Compare supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text, with ALASKA STAT.
§ 29.47.460 (2010) (exemplifying two broadly phrased statutory frameworks). While both
of these statutes are phrased broadly, their usage is vastly different. See Petersen, supra
note 70, at 602-03.
150. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.47.460 (2010).
151. See Petersen, supra note 70, at 602.
152. See infra Part IV.
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the enacting legislation and amendment in 2003.13 The General
Assembly passed the North Carolina Tax Increment Financing Act in
1982'" and the North Carolina Economic Development Financing
Act in 1993.15s Both the 1982 and 1993 legislation required passage of
a constitutional amendment, which failed each time.'5 1 These pieces
of legislation had many of the same characteristics as the ultimately-
successful 2003 legislation."'
In 2003 the General Assembly again passed TIF legislation, this
time dubbed the North Carolina Project Development Financing
Act,5 8 and voters approved this iteration of the TIF via constitutional
amendment. 5  The General Assembly's laudable purpose for the
legislation was to be "actively engaged in economic development
efforts to attract and stimulate private sector job creation and capital
investors."' 60
153. North Carolina Project Development Financing Act, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 1157
(codified as amended in scattered sections of N.C. CONST. art. V and N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 105, 158 to 160A (2003)).
154. North Carolina Tax Increment Financing Act, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 172.
155. North Carolina Economic Development Financing Act, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws
1933.
156. Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 8; see Marshall Lancaster, Those Starving
Attorneys, CAROLINA J. ONLINE (Nov. 1, 2004), http://www.carolinajournal.com
/exclusives/display-exclusive.html?id=1918.
157. For example, the 1982, 1993, and 2003 legislation all require approval by the Local
Government Commission and provide seven similar criteria for the Commission to use
when determining whether to approve the TIF project. Compare North Carolina Tax
Increment Financing Act § 1, and North Carolina Economic Development Financing Act
§ 2, with North Carolina Project Development Financing Act § 2. All three laws also
implemented a five percent maximum land area for TIF districts. Compare North Carolina
Tax Increment Financing Act § 15, and North Carolina Economic Development Financing
Act § 18, with North Carolina Project Development Financing Act § 18.
158. North Carolina Project Development Financing Act § 2.
159. See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 2.
160. North Carolina Project Development Financing Act § 2. The General Assembly
also cited the forty-eight other states that were authorized to use a form of TIF, as well as
other states' successes with TIF and the potential to increase North Carolina's
competitiveness in attracting private sector job creation and capital investment. Id. An
impressive group of proponents, including three former North Carolina governors and
numerous high profile organizations, contributed cachet and finances to the constitutional
amendment campaign. See Tom Ashcraft, Op-Ed., Preserve Democracy; Reject
Amendment One, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Sept. 4, 2004, at 13A ("[P]roponents include
former governors Jim Holshouser, Jim Hunt and Jim Martin; some counties, cities and
towns; many chambers of commerce; real estate and banking groups; business
organizations; and associations of local officeholders."); see also Mark Binker, Amendment
Backers Pitch in $1.6 Million, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), Oct. 27, 2004, at Al
("Law firms, power companies and banks were among the largest and most frequent
contributors to the Amendment One campaign. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North
Carolina, Wachovia and Bank of America were the highest contributors, donating
$100,000 each to the campaign.").
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Passage of the amendment ultimately allowed local governments
to create a TIF district without a referendum, which would otherwise
be barred by the North Carolina Constitution.'6 ' After passage,
challenges were mounted against the amendment, alleging that it was
mired in obfuscated language that swayed voters toward approval.162
These challenges were ultimately unsuccessful,163 and TIF remains a
public financing option in North Carolina today.'
B. Elements of North Carolina's TIF Statute
North Carolina's TIF statute shares many characteristics with
other states' statutes, but also introduces additional elements that add
complexity to the process. First, like many states, North Carolina
employs a list of approved uses for TIF by counties and cities,
generally consistent with the use of general obligation bonds. 6 s
However, TIF specifically cannot be used for several purposes,
including fire stations, police stations, jails, libraries, golf courses,
swimming pools, marinas, general public buildings (such as city halls
161. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 14 (authorizing TIF without a referendum). TIF would
be barred otherwise without a referendum, as it represented a pledging of a portion of a
local government's taxing authority. See id. § 4 (stating that the General Assembly may
not allow a county, city, or town to contract debts secured by a pledge of "its faith and
credit" without a popular vote except for emergency purposes or to repay prior debts).
162. See, e.g., Bishop v. Bartlett, 575 F.3d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district
court's order to dismiss and finding the plaintiffs' complaint did not actually allege that
voters were misled by the ballot language).
163. Id. at 422; see also Orr, NCICL File Suit Against Amendment One, TRIANGLE
Bus. J. (Nov. 6, 2006, 2:17 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/stories
/2006/11/06/daily3.html?page=all.
164. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-101 to 159-113 (2011). There were several further
alterations made to North Carolina's TIF statute by a 2007 law, which expanded the
permissible uses of TIF bonds and introduced a requirement that base property tax
valuation be readjusted during revaluation years. See Rivenbark, Denning & Millonzi,
supra note 25, at 1 (describing updates to North Carolina's TIF legislation).
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-48(b)-(d), 160A-536 (2011). This statute allows for TIF to
be used to fund, among other things, airport facilities, auditoriums, coliseums, arenas,
stadiums, civic centers, convention centers, hospitals, art galleries, museums, historic
properties, parking facilities, parks, recreation facilities (such as playgrounds and
recreation centers), land acquisitions, sewer systems, flood control facilities, water
systems, industrial parks (including shell buildings), railroad corridors, community college
facility construction, school facility construction, street and sidewalk improvements,
housing projects for low to moderate income residents, electric facility capital costs, beach
erosion controls, hurricane protections, downtown revitalization projects, urban area
revitalization projects, drainage projects, sewage collection and disposal systems, and
watershed improvement projects. Id. It also is a common approach in other states for
public financing instruments, such as TIF, to have a prescribed list of uses. See generally
CDFA STATE-BY-STATE, supra note 19 (explaining the different approved uses of TIF in
forty-nine states and the District of Columbia).
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and courthouses), public vehicles, and landfills.166 This list of non-
approved uses does not include interest on the TIF bonds, which may
be paid for up to seven years after construction projects are
completed, and the statutory framework also allows for the bond
proceeds to be used outside the TIF district if used to benefit private
development inside the TIF district."'
The TIF district-creation process in North Carolina remains
similar to the model used by other states and the model TIF statute.
The city or county must establish a "Development Financing
District," which is a simple renaming of a TIF district from other
states.'" The statute also imposes requirements on the types of
property that may comprise the TIF district.'6 9 The municipality or
county must also adopt a "Development Financing Plan," 1o0 similar to
many other states' requirement for a plan in their TIF statutes."' The
plan requires the satisfaction of ten elements'72 and, if a
manufacturing facility is built, approval by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.17
North Carolina's statute differs from other TIF statutes in two
primary ways: percentage-based land use restrictions and increased
intergovernmental notification requirements. To the first item, if a
TIF district is located outside of a city's central business district, then
no more than twenty percent may be used for retail, hotels, banking,
166. This list of excluded uses is created by the authority-granting statute, which states
that if the proposed use is not included in section 159-48 or section 160A-536, then it is not
allowed to be funded through a TIF regime. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-103(a) (2011)
(providing a broader list of purposes for which general obligation bonds may be used).
167. Id. § 159-103.
168. Id. H§ 158-7.3(b)-(c).
169. County TIF districts are required to consist of property that is (1) blighted; (2)
suitable for rehabilitation or conservation; or (3) suitable for economic development. Id
§ 158-7.3(c). Municipal TIF district property may meet any of the county criteria, id.
§ 160A-503, or may be deemed a "redevelopment area" by a city's planning commission to
qualify. Id. § 160A-515.1.
170. Id. §§ 158-7.3(d), 160A-515.1(c).
171. See, e.g., supra notes 82,104, 146 and accompanying text.
172. These ten elements include: (1) a description of the district's boundaries; (2) a
description of the proposed public and private development in the district; (3) the costs of
the proposed activities; (4) the sources and amounts of funds to pay for the activities; (5)
the base property valuation in the district; (6) the projected increases in property value
assessment in the district; (7) an estimate of the district's lifespan; (8) a description of how
the proposed development will benefit residents and businesses in the district; (9) a
description of how to "ameliorate" harm if the projects negatively affect residents and
business owners; and (10) a statement that any users of manufacturing facilities will be
required to pay a wage above the average manufacturing wage in the county or not less
than ten percent of the average weekly manufacturing wage statewide. § 158-7.3(d).
173. Id. §§ 158-7.3(g), 160A-515.1(f).
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financial services offered to consumers, or other commercial use
besides office space.17 4 This provision, however, does not apply to
lower-wealth counties"' or to districts "created primarily for tourism-
related economic development."" 6 Additionally, the statute requires
that the district not exceed five percent of the total land area in the
city or county establishing a TIF.17 This five percent limit may be
overly constrictive on governmental units with a smaller amount of
total land area or larger governmental units with multiple areas of
blight scattered throughout the city or county. Ultimately, the five
percent limit constrains cities from using TIF in many situations,"1 8
and upward revision would be one way to increase TIF use.
There are also considerable requirements for intergovernmental
notice and approval in the North Carolina TIF statute. First, counties
cannot locate a TIF district within city limits at the time the district is
created unless both local government entities agree.' 9 Second, before
a municipality may adopt a TIF plan, it must provide notice to the
county or counties where the district is to be located.8 o If a county
does not act within twenty-eight days or approves the plan, the
174. Id. § 158-7.3(a)(1).
175. Low-wealth counties--called "development tier one counties" in North
Carolina-are determined by population, percentage of population below the federal
poverty level, average rate of unemployment, median household income, percentage
growth in population, and property values. See id. § 143B-437.08.
176. See id. § 158-7.3(a)(1) (describing tourism related economic development as
"developments featuring facilities for exhibitions, athletic and cultural events, show and
public gatherings, racing facilities, parks and recreation facilities, art galleries, museums,
and art centers").
177. Id. §§ 158-7.3(c), 160A-515.1(b). Note, however, that land annexed by a city does
not count against the city's five-percent limit unless the city and county enter into an
increment agreement. Id. § 159-107(e). Without an agreement, a city may annex land into
the district without violating the five percent limit. See id.
178. See id. § 158-7.3(c) ("The total land area within development financing districts in a
unit... may not exceed five percent (5%) of the total land area of the unit." (emphasis
added)); id. § 160A-515.1(b). Because of this land requirement, for example, a smaller
town with blight affecting more than five percent of its total area would not be able to
declare a TIF district sufficiently large to combat the problem. Additionally, a larger town
that had more than five percent of its total land area blighted would not be able to declare
multiple TIF districts to address blight, as the wording of the statute states that the "total
land area within development financing districts"-implying all TIF districts in the city-
may not be more than five percent. Id. § 158-7.3(c). There is also some confusion
regarding joint city and county districts and how the five percent limit applies, although
some have said that the "most consistent interpretation of the act's provisions leads to the
conclusion that when counties and cities jointly act to develop a developing financing
district, . . . then the area included within the district counts against the 5-percent
limitation for both the county and the city." Rivenbark, Denning, & Millonzi, supra note
25, at 5.
179. See §§ 158-7.3(c), 159-107(e).
180. Id. §§ 158-7.3(f), 160A-515.1(e).
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governing body may adopt the TIF proposal; however, if the county
disapproves of the plan, the city may not adopt a TIEF plan approving
a TIEF district 81 City and county governing bodies must also hold a
public hearing, making sure to first publish written notice within the
taxing unit, as well as mail notice to property owners in the potential
TIEF district. '8 After successfully navigating the process at the city
and/or county level, the governmental unit must next gain approval
for the TIF plan from North Carolina's Local Government
Commission,18 a division of the Department of the State Treasurer.','
The Local Government Commission may consider several factors in
determining whether to approve a TIF project, primarily relating to
the local government unit's ability to pay the TIF bonds."s
If the Local Government Commission approves the plan, then a
typical TIF system is enacted. The tax assessor in the relevant unit of
government must be notified of the TIF district's existence;
thereafter, the tax assessor determines a base value of the property in
the district.'86 The property values in the TIF district are then used as
the base property valuation for the life of the TIF district, and the
proceeds are used to pay the TIF bonds. n The base valuation of the
TIF district may only be adjusted if the TIF plan is modified to add or
remove property from the TIF district." A special revenue fund must
181. Id. §§ 158-7.3(f), 160A-515.1(e).
182. Id. §§ 158-7.3(h), 160A-515.1(g).
183. See id. § 159-104. Note that prior to considering the TIF bonds, the Commission
may require the local government unit to send representatives to a preliminary conference
with the Commission to discuss the proposed bond issue, TIF district, and TIF plan. Id.
Further, the local governmental unit must also "publish a public notice of the application
in a newspaper of general circulation in the unit of local government." Id.
184. Id. § 159-3(e).
185. Id. § 159-105(a). The Local Government Commission considers (1) whether the
projects are necessary to secure new project development (a "but-for test"), (2) whether
the projects are feasible, (3) the debt management policies and procedures of the local
government, (4) whether the local government is in default for any of its debt service, (5)
whether the private development forecasts would occur without TIF instruments, (6)
whether taxes gathered from the TIF district, along with any accompanying security,
would be sufficient to pay the debt service on the TIF bonds, and (7) whether the
Commission can market the proposed TIF bonds at "reasonable rates of interest." Id. If all
of these are found, then the Commission will approve the TIF plan. Id. § 159-105(b).
186. Id. § 159-107(a).
187. Id.
188. Id. § 159-107(b). Prior to the 2007 amendments to the statute, property value
increases could only be from improvements to the property, not including revaluation
revenues, which required that the base value be modified to reflect the increase in
property value due solely to revaluation. See Act to Modify the Project Developing
Financing Act, § 2,2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1182, 1182-83 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 159-107(b) (2011)); see also Rivenbark, Denning & Millonzi, supra note 25, at 7
n.53. Further, section 159-107(d) describes how, in a year with an incremental assessed
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then be established to hold the incremental revenues and service the
debt."' TIF revenues can be used to finance additional capital
expenses outlined in the TIF plan, to pay down debt from TIF bonds,
to repay other governmental funds used to pay down TIF debt, and to
replenish reserve funds for TIF. 9o
Additionally, a local governmental unit may pledge or grant a
security interest in any of its revenue sources,19' including a city's
ability to use its sales tax revenues to repay its debt.'" Local
government units may also enter into an agreement with a developer
for a minimum property tax assessment,'93 which can guarantee that
increments are created over time, a feature that is unique to TIF and
which has worked well in at least one North Carolina TIF project.'94
Banks may also issue a letter of credit to further securitize the debt.195
Beyond revenue streams, the local government unit may also pledge a
mortgage interest in the financed asset,'" as well as other revenues
collected by the unit, such as special assessments.197 Lastly, a local
government unit may pledge the "faith and credit" (or taxing
value, tax proceeds may be distributed to the local governmental unit. First, net proceeds
are calculated, which are gross revenues net refunds, releases, and collection fees. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 159-107(d) (2011). Second, the net proceeds are paid to the taxing units
levying specific taxes relating to (1) general obligation debt, (2) non-school taxes levied by
a vote of the people, (3) taxes levied for a municipal or county service district, and (4)
taxes levied by a taxing unit in a TIF district established by a different governmental unit
without an increment agreement. Id. Third, the remaining taxes are multiplied by the base
valuation of the district and then divided by the current valuation of the district. Id. Lastly,
this amount is retained by the county, city, or special district and then turned over to the
finance officer of the governmental unit, who places the funds in the special revenue
increment fund. Id.
189. Id. § 159-107(c).
190. Id. § 159-107(f).
191. Id. § 159-111(b).
192. Rivenbark, Denning & Millonzi, supra note 25, at 8 (noting that because "sales tax
revenue results from the taxing power of counties, cities, but not counties, may pledge
sales tax revenues as security for repayment").
193. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-108(a) (2011).
194. See infra notes 274-82 and accompanying text.
195. For example, Bank of America provided a letter of credit for the City of Roanoke
Rapids in its construction of the Roanoke Rapids Theatre. Roanoke Rapids Project
Summary, U. N.C. CHAPEL HILL SCH. GOv'T, http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc
.edu/files/Roanoke%2ORapids%20TIF%20summary.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2012).
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-111(b) (2011) (allowing local governments to pledge a
security interest in the capital asset created with the TIF bonds, which gives investors the
ability to foreclose upon the asset).
197. Id. §H 159-111(b), 153A-210.4(b), 160A-239.4(b) (allowing for the pledging of
special assessment revenues for additional TIF securities).
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authority) of the unit as an additional security'" if there is a
successful voter referendum to issue general obligation bond debt.99
C. Comparison of North Carolina Statute to APA Model Statute
Comparing the model TIF statute to the North Carolina statute
reveals a number of differences, likely a result of their respective
creators' attempts to reach different audiences. The American
Planning Association created the model TIF statute as a way to show
generalized practices throughout the United States 21 while the North
Carolina General Assembly passed the Project Development
Financing Act after two previous failed attempts at passage 2 0' and
with the benefit of being the forty-ninth state to enact a TIF statute.
Perhaps because of the different audiences and precautionary tales of
TIF gone wrong in other states,203 North Carolina's TIF statute
contains more procedural and use restrictions than the model TIF
statute.
There are certainly similarities between the North Carolina
statute and the model TIF statute.21 However, while these similarities
exist, differences abound between the open-ended model TIEF statute
198. Id. § 159-111(a).
199. Id. ("Before such a pledge [of the faith and credit of the local government unit]
may be given, the unit shall follow the procedures and meet the requirements for approval
of general obligation bonds under Article 4 of this Chapter."); id. § 159-61(a).
200. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
202. See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 2.
203. See generally Lefcoe, supra note 27 (describing myriad TIF project successes and
failures and re-stating six oft-used criticisms against TIF regimes).
204. For example, North Carolina provides for the establishment of a similar special
fund to account for TIF proceeds. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-107(c) (2011), with
AM. PLANNING ASS'N, supra note 57, § 14-302(10), at 14-61 (establishing separate
accounting funds within each statute for property tax increments in TIF districts). North
Carolina also allows the use of sales tax as part of the TIF (although North Carolina only
allows sales tax to be an additional security for the debt, whereas the Model TIF statute
allows independent sales tax TIFs). Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-111(b) (2011), with
AM. PLANNING ASS'N, supra note 57, § 14-302(6), at 14-59 to 14-60 (highlighting
differences between the statute's use of sales tax revenues as additional securities or as
independent tax bases on which to base a TIF regime). Further, North Carolina requires a
plan to be created prior to implementing a TIF district. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. H§ 158-
7.3(b), 160A-515.1(a) (2011), with AM. PLANNING ASS'N, supra note 57, § 14-302(4)(a), at
14-58 (requiring development of plans in both statutes before implementing a TIF). Both
statutes also require that the local tax assessor be notified of the TIF district and create a
base valuation, which is typical of TIF schemes in general. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 159-107(a) (2011), with AM. PLANNING ASS'N, supra note 57, § 14-302(7)-(8), at 14-60
(requiring that base property valuations be created to determine the property tax
increment); see also Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 3-4 (discussing typical tax
collection regimes in TIF districts).
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and North Carolina's more restrictive iteration. The model TIF
statute does not proscribe certain uses of TIF, while North Carolina's
TIF statute does so extensively. 205 The model TIEF statute does not
require the approval of a statewide finance board, while North
Carolina requires notification of (and approval by) the Local
Government Commission as well as other intergovernmental
notifications.2 0 Further, the model TIF statute does not impose total
land percentage ceilings like the North Carolina statute,207 nor does
the model TIF statute create percentage limits on retail
establishments that may be built in a TIF district.208
D. Comparison of North Carolina Statute to Aggressively Used
Statutes
North Carolina and aggressive TIF states utilize similar TIF
district revenue capture mechanisms,2 09 and at times require similar
approval procedures for prospective TIF districts (such as a public
hearing requirement for property holders in the TIF district). 2 10
Aggressive TIF states have similar "use" restrictions to North
Carolina, although the aggressive users tend to allow for higher
percentage limits on total TIF district land than North Carolina.2 1
205. Compare AM. PLANNING ASS'N, supra note 57, §§ 14-302(1)-(10), at 14-57 to 14-
62, with supra note 166 and accompanying text (highlighting differences in use
restrictions).
206. Compare AM. PLANNING ASS'N, supra note 57, § 14-302(1)-(10), at 14-57 to 14-
62, with supra notes 179-185 and accompanying text (outlining relevant differences in
intergovernmental notifications).
207. Compare AM. PLANNING Ass'N, supra note 57, § 14-302(1)-(10), at 14-57 to 14-
62, with supra note 177 and accompanying text (pointing out the lack of "use ceilings" in
the model statute, as well as upper thresholds in the North Carolina statute).
208. Compare AM. PLANNING Ass'N, supra note 57, § 14-302(1)-(10), at 14-57 to 14-62,
with supra notes 174-176 and accompanying text.
209. Compare, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-107(c)-(d) (2011) ("When a unit of local
government has established a development financing district,... the unit shall establish a
separate fund to account for the proceeds paid to the unit from taxes levied on the
incremental valuation of the district."), with CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33670(b)
(West 1999 & Supp. 2012) ("[T]hat portion of the levied taxes each year in excess of [the
base valuation] amount . .. shall be paid into a special fund of the redevelopment agency
to pay the principal of and interest on loans . .. incurred by the redevelopment agency to
finance ... the redevelopment project.").
210. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 158-7.3(h), 160A-515.1(g) (2011); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/11-74.4-5 (West Supp. 2012) (outlining Illinois public hearing requirement).
211. Compare supra note 114 and accompanying text (describing legislation imposing a
thirty-five percent cap on total TIF land that falls within a municipality), with N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 158-7.3(c), 160A-515.1(b) (2011) (establishing a five percent cap on total city or
county land within a TIF district). Minnesota, at one time, also imposed a limitation that
only five percent of the total land in a municipality may be used for a TIF district, but this
has since been removed. See Christina G. Dudley, Comment, Tax Increment Financing for
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Some aggressive users also allow for the use of TIF districts for
projects other than "blighted" areas, such as subsidizing private
developments 212 and the development of a corporate headquarters.2 13
North Carolina's TIF legislation allows for myriad uses relating to
economic development and also eschews an explicit blight
requirement.214 Many aggressive states, however, maintain the blight
requirement or adopt a policy promoting TIF for blight removal.215
Aggressively used TIF statutes also typically require that TIF
plans be made before a district is approved,216 and some of the
aggressive states also require a more stringent feasibility study,
outlining the locality's ability to pay their debt service before a TIF
district may be approved.2" This stronger debt feasibility requirement
is also found in North Carolina's statute. 218 North Carolina differs
from some aggressive states by not earmarking portions of TIEF
proceeds for certain items (such as affordable housing) ,219 but the
state retains a relatively similar lifespan for its TIF districts.220
Redevelopment in Missouri: Beauty and the Beast, 54 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 77, 87
(1985).
212. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
213. See Tomme, supra note 130, at 213-15 (describing a Minnesota town's use of TIF
to attract Best Buy's corporate headquarters).
214. See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text. North Carolina's prime example
of using TIF to spur economic development is the construction of the Roanoke Rapids
Theatre, discussed infra Part IVA.
215. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33037(a) (West 2010) (stating that in
order "[tlo protect and promote the sound development and redevelopment of blighted
areas," it is the state's policy to "remedy[] such injurious conditions through the
employment of all appropriate means"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-10-20 (16) (West 2007 &
Supp. 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-10-90 (West 2007) (listing "blighted or conservation
areas" as the areas suitable for TIF development).
216. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33330 (West 2010).
217. See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-74.4-4.1 (West 2005).
218. See supra notes 170-172, 185 and accompanying text (describing the elements of
the TIF plan as well as the debt requirements examined by the Local Government
Commission).
219. Compare Rivenbark, Denning & Millonzi, supra note 25, at 6 (providing a table of
TIF plan requirements that includes a "description" of how the TIF district will benefit
residents in terms of affordable housing, but setting no requirement as to the portion of
the TIF proceeds to be allocated for it), with CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33334.2(a)
(West 2010) (reserving "not less than 20 percent of all taxes ... allocated to the
[development] agency ... for the purposes of increasing, improving, and preserving the
community's supply of low- and moderate-income housing"). When redevelopment
agencies have not complied with this provision, California courts have enforced the twenty
percent requirement. See, e.g., Fontana Redevelopment Agency v. Torres, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d
875, 884 (Ct. App. 2007); Craig v. City of Poway, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 535 (Ct. App. 1994).
220. Compare supra note 172 and accompanying text (describing North Carolina's
thirty-year maximum TIF district lifespan), with supra note 123 and accompanying text
(describing various lifespans tending toward the twenty- to thirty-year range).
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North Carolina's approval mechanisms, most notably the
requirement of a state governing board's approval"' (and county
approval if a municipality is offering the TIlF proposal"22 ), are
considerably more stringent than those of many aggressive TIF
states.2  However, the lack of a state approval mechanism is not
universal between the aggressive users of TIF; for example, Michigan
imposes a state approval process similar to North Carolina's before
authorization of TIF districts is granted. 24 There are also different
structural relationships between layers of government in North
Carolina than in some other states. In Ohio, for example, schools
have independent taxing authority and special provisions are required
regarding TIF proceeds for school systems affected by the TIF
district.225 In contrast, North Carolina schools receive local dollars
through the vehicle of county governments, so this separate dialogue
with the school system is unnecessary.2 On one hand, this insulation
of municipalities from competitive tax structures can be a positive
governance principle, as shown by the possible shielding of tax
revenues from other governmental entities via TIF districts in
California.2 27 On the other hand, creating myriad approval bodies for
a public finance instrument may create unnecessary complexities for
local government managers seeking streamlined community
redevelopment through TIF.
The aggressive states also vary regarding the pledging of
additional revenues or property interests to further securitize TIF
debt.22 Some states, such as Illinois, allow for the general taxing
power to be pledged,229 while other aggressive states, such as Iowa,
221. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-104 (2011) (requiring TIF proposals to gain approval
from the Local Government Commission); id. § 159-3(e) (defining the Local Government
Commission as "a division of the Department of the State Treasurer").
222. See supra notes 179-182 and accompanying text.
223. For example, as of 2008, California required only the approval of the issuing local
government. See CDFA STATE-BY-STATE, supra note 19, at 4. The same applies to
Illinois, Iowa, and South Carolina. Id. at 13, 15, 40.
224. MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.1818 (West 2006).
225. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
226. See generally Kara Millonzi, County Responsibility for School Funding, COATES'
CANONS: NC LOC. GOv'T L. BLOG (Apr. 22, 2010),
http://sogweb.sog.unc.edulblogs/localgovt/?p=2282 (discussing the constitutional and
statutory framework governing the funding of North Carolina schools).
227. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
228. See generally CDFA STATE-BY-STATE, supra note 19 (describing various
financing mechanisms for TIF and various revenues that may be pledged in each state that
authorized TIF).
229. See 65 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-74.4-8(b)(3) (West Supp. 2012); see also
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 469.178,475.58 (West Supp. 2012).
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allow general obligation bonds to be used as an additional form of
security230 (though they require a referendum before the bonds are
issued). 231 North Carolina requires a publicly voted bond referendum
in the issuing governmental unit for such general obligation debt.
Lastly, states vary widely in whether sales tax is allowed as an
additional form of security 23 3: North Carolina allows the use of sales
tax as additional security for TIF bonds, but does not authorize TIF
districts based solely on sales tax revenue. 234
E. Comparison of North Carolina Statute to Conservatively Used
Statutes
Conservative states also use structural features similar to those of
North Carolina's TIF statute, including the base valuation
requirement, requirements for public hearings, and a requirement
that the area be "blighted" or otherwise suitable for economic
development.2" North Carolina's TIF statute shares a common theme
with many conservatively used TIF state statutes: namely, a
requirement of state approval before a TIF district is authorized.236
However, North Carolina's statute differs significantly from Alaska's,
which includes little by way of state or county oversight of
municipalities.3 In Alaska, no TIF districts currently exist,23
230. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.9 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 403.12(5) (West 2009); Webster Realty Co. v. City of Fort Dodge, 174 N.W.2d 413, 417
(Iowa 1970). For a list of voter referendum requirements among the states, see K.C.
Tydgat, Voting Down the Debt or Voting Up the Cost: Unintended Effects of
Referendum Requirements 9 (Spring 2009) (unpublished M.P.A. Capstone Paper,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), http://www.mpa.unc.edu/sites/www
,mpa.unc.edu/files/K.C.TygatsCapstone.pdf.
231. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 384.28 (West 2011).
232. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4 (providing that a local government may not contract
debts secured by "a pledge of its faith and credit unless approved by a majority of the
qualified voters of the unit who vote thereon"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-45 (2011) (allowing
for use of general obligation bonds subject to certain conditions).
233. See supra notes 121, 127 and accompanying text.
234. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-111(b) (2011).
235. See supra notes 137-142 and accompanying text; supra notes 165-173 (describing
mechanisms of increment capture, requirement of TIF plans, and other common
characteristics of TIF regimes).
236. Compare supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text (discussing approval
requirements of conservative TIF states), with supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text
(describing North Carolina's approval requirements). But see ALASKA STAT. § 29.47.460
(2010) (granting oversight of the TIF obligations to the issuing municipality and not
requiring state approval); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3245.2 (2009) ("The governing body of
any county, city or town may adopt tax increment financing by passing an ordinance
designating a development project area .. "
237. See supra note 221.
238. See Petersen, supra note 70, at 602.
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suggesting that the use of TIF is not entirely a function of statutory
construction, but is also influenced significantly by ancillary factors
that contribute to whether TIFs are authorized and successful. Lastly,
the conservatively used TIF statutes do not exhibit the same size (five
percent) and use ceilings (retail limited to twenty percent) for TIF
districts as the North Carolina statute,23 9 although use prescriptions
are certainly present within some statutes.
F. North Carolina's TIF Framework: Many Shared Features, but
Additional Restrictions Stifle TIF
The basic structure of TIF in North Carolina is similar to the
common practices of other states24 1 as well as the model statute.2 42
However, several elements of North Carolina's statute might reduce
the prevalence of TIF in the state. While North Carolina's statute
limits certain types of uses like other statutes,243 two unique features
in the stature are the twenty percent limit on retail space in the TIEF
district2 and the five percent upper limit of total city or county area
that may be within a TIF district. 245 Further, while some states use
notice and approval requirements by state or other government
entities,2 46 North Carolina's Local Government Commission is a state-
run approval entity, which enjoys wide discretion and turns a critical
eye to a local government's ability to repay its issued debt.247 These
additional features likely inhibit use of TIF, although other root
causes may also contribute to its non-use. These potential causes are
239. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 158-7.3(a)(1)(c), 160A-515.1(b) (2011).
240. See, e.g., supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text (describing the blight
requirement and other permitted TIF uses in Missouri, South Carolina, and Virginia).
241. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text (discussing similarities between
North Carolina's financial structuring and approval mechanisms within the issuing
governmental entity and of the government's affected citizens).
242. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing similarities between the
model TIF statute and North Carolina's provisions).
243. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
244. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.3(a)(1) (2011).
245. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
247. See K. Lee Carter, Jr., State Oversight of Local Government Finance, in STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA: THEIR EVOLUTION AND
CURRENT STATUS 71, 77 (Charles D. Liner ed., 2d ed. 1995) (noting that during the
approval process, the Local Government Commission will "review[] a local government's
financial statements, budgets, and other documents to determine if there are financial or
other problems that should be corrected by local officials before a unit of government
issues debt"). For a history of the Local Government Commission, including the
significant depression-era defaults leading to its formation, see JOHN ALEXANDER
MCMAHON, N.C. ASS'N OF CNTY. COMM'RS, THE NORTH CAROLINA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT COMMISSION 1-18 (1960).
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explored further through three North Carolina case studies in Part
IV. Other potential causes and available debt financing substitutes
are considered in Part V.
IV. THREE NORTH CAROLINA CASE STUDIES
North Carolina has authorized three TIF districts to date, and
each of these three examples has had a different level of success: one
TIF district is widely acknowledged as a resounding failure, another
TIF district appears to be successful, and a third was abandoned in
favor of an alternate form of financing before a single TIF bond was
issued. This Part explores these three case studies to find different
statutory and environmental features that may have contributed to
these vastly different outcomes, and to illustrate the strengths and
weaknesses of North Carolina's approach to TIF.
A. Roanoke Rapids
The Roanoke Rapids Theatre, discussed at the outset of this
Comment, is North Carolina's most widely discussed and criticized
TIF deal.2 4 8 The City of Roanoke Rapids constructed a theatre
intended to serve as the central feature of an economic development
district focused on tourism and entertainment revenues: the Carolina
Crossroads Music and Entertainment District.249 Prior to being
developed, the property was 123 acres of rural land along Interstate
95 with an assessed base value of $292,690.250
The City of Roanoke Rapids crafted a five-year plan to realize
the Carolina Crossroads vision, anticipating $257 million in
investment and including multiple attractions: additional theaters,
retail establishments, hotels, and a sports complex.251 Roanoke
Rapids then issued $21.5 million in TIF bonds to bring the project to
fruition.252 The funds to repay these TIF bonds would come from
248. Carolina Journal widely panned the deal. See Carolina Journal News Reports,
Randy Parton Theatre, CAROLINA J. ONLINE, http://www.carolinajournal.com
/exclusives/series.html?id=31 (last visited Sept. 26, 2012) (listing a number of Carolina
Journal stories tracking the development of the Roanoke Rapids Theatre).
249. See Carrington, supra note 1.
250. Roanoke Rapids Project Summary, supra note 195.
251. Id.; see also RANDY PARTON THEATER FEASIBILITY STUDY, ECONOMIC
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES 1 (Apr. 15, 2005), http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu
/files/RRdocumt-ERA%20market%20feasibility%20study-complete.pdf (outlining key
elements of the planned development, including two hotels, 200,000 square feet of retail
space, and other entertainment opportunities).
252. Roanoke Rapids Project Summary, supra note 195 (listing the breakdown of the
bond funds: approximately $13 million to acquire the theatre, $4 million to retire start up
cost debt, $2 million for debt service reserves, $1.5 million for capitalized interest, and
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multiple sources, primarily from lease payments by Moonlight Bandit
Productions, Randy Parton's production company. 253 As an additional
security, the City of Roanoke Rapids pledged the increased property
tax revenues from the Carolina Crossroads Entertainment and Music
District if the lease payments proved insufficient, as well as its sales
tax revenues.25 4 To further shore up the creditworthiness of the
facility, Roanoke Rapids also obtained a letter of credit from Bank of
America.55
The plan gained its final approval from the Local Government
Commission in February 2007,256 and Randy Parton gave his first
performance in July of that year.5 Yet by November, the city was
displeased with the theatre's performance and assumed management
control from Parton and Moonlight Bandit Productions.258 The city
eventually terminated Parton's involvement in the theatre's
operations entirely5 9 and has struggled to attract artists to perform in
the venue, 260 resulting in significant negative publicity.261 Today, the
theatre is occupied by HSV Entertainment, LLC, which is operating
an entertainment and Internet gambling enterprise under a two-year
lease, with an option to purchase after expiration of the lease.262
The Roanoke Rapids Theatre leaves several legacies in its wake.
Political fallout was swift, as the Mayor and two members of the City




255. See Minutes, N.C. DEP'T OF STATE TREASURER, LOCAL GOv'T COMM'N (Feb. 6,
2007), http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.uncedu/files/RRdocumt-LGC%20minutes-
bonds%20approval.pdf. A letter of credit is "[an instrument under which the
issuer... agrees to honor a draft or other demand for payment made by a third
party .. . as long as the draft or demand complies with specified conditions. ... " BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 987 (9th ed. 2009).
256. Minutes, supra note 255.
257. See Don Carrington, Show Time for Parton Theatre: Wisdom of Local
Government Commission to be Tested Soon, CAROLINA J. ONLINE (May 30, 2007),
http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display-exclusive.html?id=4096.
258. See Carrington, supra note 1; see also Roanoke Rapids Project Summary, supra
note 195 (noting that the city drafted a new set of agreements removing management
responsibilities from Parton and Moonlight Bandit Productions, changed the theatre's
name from the Randy Parton Theatre to the Roanoke Rapids Theatre, and reduced
Parton's "artist fee" from $1.25 million annually to $250,000).
259. Carrington, supra note 1.
260. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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Council were voted out of office shortly after the theatre began to
falter.2 63 A Roanoke Rapids resident, in conjunction with the North
Carolina Institute for Constitutional Law, filed suit against Randy
Parton and others associated with the theatre,2" although the case
was dismissed shortly thereafter. 6 Several residents of the Brandy
Creek community, a historically African-American community
adjacent to Roanoke Rapids, have recently sued to recover past
property taxes from the city after being annexed into Roanoke
Rapids and receiving what amounted to property revaluations of 700
percent.2" The city continues to struggle financially as it services the
debt created by the TIF bonds, and a recent agreement to sell the
entire facility for $7.1 million, which still would have left the city with
$12 million in debt after the sale,' fell through. 26 The city recently
approved 2 69 a new two-year lease proposal from a prospective tenant,
which contains a provision allowing fifteen percent of the facility to
be used for Internet gambling stations, although its future is now in
doubt.270
263. Beau Minnick, No Encore for Roanoke Rapids Mayor, Councilmen, WRAL.COM
(Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.wral.com/news/local/politics/story/6349193/.
264. See Jeanette K. Doran, NCICL Files Lawsuit Against Randy Parton and Others
for Fraud, N.C. INST. FOR CONST. L. (June 19, 2008), http://www.ncicl.org/article/11
(describing the lawsuit brought by Roanoke Rapids resident Milton James Garrett against
Randy Parton, his production company, and several other defendants for their actions
related to the Roanoke Rapids Theatre).
265. Garrett v. Parton, No. 08 CVS 922, slip op. at 17 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Jan. 30, 2009)
(dismissing the aforementioned lawsuit), available at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net
/TCDDotNetPublic/default.aspx?CID=3&caseNumber=08CS922.
266. See Bob Geary, Residents Sue Over lacked-Up Property Values, INDYWEEK.COM
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/residents-sue-over-jacked-up-
property-values/Content?oid=3151953 (noting the events leading to the annexation as well
as the revaluations in the community of up to 1,400 percent of the previous values). For
the UNC Center for Civil Rights' description of the lawsuit, as well as the filed complaint
and presentation made to the Roanoke Rapids City Council, see Peter Hull Gilbert,
Brandy Creek Residents Sue for Refund of Taxes, U. N.C. SCH. L. (Aug. 24, 2012),
http://blogs.law.unc.edu/civilrights/2012/08/24/brandy-creek-residents-sue-for-refund-of-
taxes/. The residents were de-annexed from Roanoke Rapids in 2011 by action of the
North Carolina General Assembly. Id.
267. See Minnick, supra note 8. The individual to whom the theatre was sold, Lafayette
Gatling, originally purchased the facility in 2009 for $12.5 million, but fell behind on his
payments to Roanoke Rapids, resulting in previous litigation between Gatling and the
city. See Roanoke Rapids Regains Control of Troubled Theater, WRAL.COM (Aug. 31,
2010), http://www.wral.com/news/locallstory/8217472/.
268. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
270. See Roger Bell, Board OKs Gaming Change, DAILY HERALD (Roanoke Rapids,
N.C.), June 22, 2012, at 1 (noting the Roanoke Rapids Planning Board's approval of an
amendment to the city's land use ordinance allowing for electronic gaming in the city's
entertainment district, where the theatre is located). This development has drawn
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North Carolina's Local Government Commission also received
criticism as a result of the Carolina Crossroads episode, and some
have questioned the scope and quality of its process of local
government debt approval.271 The Carolina Crossroads TIF district
was approved "based primarily on an assessment of the city's capacity
to repay the bond debt," rather than "the market feasibility or
management capacity of the theater."m To address these concerns
going forward, the Local Government Commission may need the
additional power to scrutinize and disapprove of projects for reasons
beyond inability to pay the debt service.273 However, providing these
additional layers of scrutiny may discourage future developers from
using TIF, even though it has been used quite successfully by a recent
development in Woodfin in Buncombe County, North Carolina.
B. Buncombe County (Woodfin)
Woodfin was the second TIF project in North Carolina, and its
financing included an initial $12.9 million TIF bond issue-with an
ultimate plan to issue as much as $25 million.274 The TIF debt was
issued by Buncombe County with the intent to finance various public
improvements as part of a new town center in Woodfin, a small town
just outside of Asheville.27 s The TIF district's total land area is 205
significant criticism from local residents. See Titus Workman, Our View: Gambling at
Theater Will Tarnish City, DAILY HERALD (June 21, 2012),
http://www.rrdailyherald.com/opinion/our-view-gambling-at-theater-will-tarnish-
city/articlebfcdl8b2-bbae-llel-8817-001a4bcf887a.htm (comparing the proliferation of
Internet gaming facilities in Roanoke Rapids to the movie It's a Wonderful Life, and the
movie's transformation of Bedford Falls into the "disreputable" Potterville). The Internet
sweepstakes portion of the business no longer appears viable, as the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has prohibited Internet sweepstakes businesses in the state. See Hest
Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue, No. 169A11-2, 2012 WL 6218202, at *11 (N.C. Dec. 14,
2012). Further, a stay was not granted as sweepstakes operators consider appeals. See
Sweepstakes Protocol Sought Before Jan. 3, DAILY HERALD (Dec. 24, 2012),
http://www.rrdailyherald.com/access/sweepstakes-protocol-sought-before-
jan/article_5403319c-4df4-11e2-a589-0019bb2963f4.html.
271. Lee Weisbecker, Parton Saga Raises Questions about Oversight of TIF Bonds,
TRIANGLE Bus. J., Feb. 15, 2008, at 9 ("What the voting members of the [Local
Government Commission] didn't consider was data about whether the theater had a
chance of succeeding as an economic development project....").
272. Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 13.
273. For further discussion of this argument, see generally JOHN LOCKE FOUND.,
SPOTLIGHT, COMMON-SENSE TIF REFORMS: WAYS TO AVOID RANDY PARTON
THEATRE-LIKE DEBACLES AND OTHER DISASTERS (May 28, 2008),
http://www.johnlocke.org/acrobat/spotlights/spotlight-350-tifreforms.pdf.
274. See Woodfin TIF-Summary, U. N.C. CHAPEL HILL SCH. Gov'T,
http://www.sog.unc.edulsites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/Woodfin%20TIF-summary.pdf (last
visited Sept. 26, 2012).
275. Id.
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acres adjacent to Interstate 26 in western North Carolina, and the
developer with whom the county is working owns approximately
three-quarters of it. 76 The district's base value was initially set at
$13.8 million, and the TIF plan forecasts another $230 million in
private investment by 2015.277
The project is a multi-phase development project, primarily
composed of residential and office space.27 8 The planned public
improvements include street upgrades, water and sewer extensions,
pedestrian walkways, and bike trails-all of which will be conveyed to
the Town of Woodfin after the project's completion.7 Unlike the
Roanoke Rapids TIF plan, which required an additional pledge of
sales taxes in addition to the tax increments,2 so the security pledged by
Buncombe County for the TIF bonds was the incremental tax
revenues, strengthened by a minimum assessment agreement between
the developer, the Town of Woodfin, and Buncombe County to
impose property tax valuations sufficient to pay the TIF bond debt.281
Today, the project has progressed well, with significant development
occurring in commercial, residential, and recreational facilities. 282
However, the story of North Carolina's third authorized TIF
project-the North Carolina Research Campus-perhaps provides
the best explanation for why TIF has stalled in North Carolina.
C. North Carolina Research Campus (Kannapolis)
The North Carolina Research Campus is a project housed on the
site of a former mill in downtown Kannapolis.83 Cannon Mills, once
the largest manufacturer of sheets and towels worldwide, and at one
time an employer of 25,000 residents, owned the mill."' Pillowtex
Corporation, whose 2003 bankruptcy prompted the largest one-day
layoff in North Carolina's history and cost 4,340 Kannapolis residents




280. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
281. See Woodfin TIF-Summary, supra note 274. This security option is available to
all users of TIF in North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-108(a) (2011).
282. See, e.g., Reynolds Village, REYNOLDSMOUNTAIN.COM,
http://www.reynoldsmountain.com/reynoldsmountain/index.php/village (last visited Sept.
25, 2012) (advertising Reynolds Village as "a unique opportunity to combine the flexibility
of the planned unit development zoning (PUD) with a wide-variety of approved uses and
the financing capability of a Tax Incremental Financing district").
283. NC Research Campus History, N.C. RES, CAMPUS,
http://www.ncresearchcampus.netlabout-ncrc/ncrc-history.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2012).
284. Id.
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their jobs, eventually purchased Cannon Mills. 28S The vacancy
resulting from the loss of Pillotex made downtown Kannapolis ripe
for a TIF project, and TIF bonds were ultimately approved to finance
a proposed $168 million development project."' The North Carolina
Research Campus, designed as a joint venture between Dole Foods,
Duke University, and the University of North Carolina System, was
to use these TIF bonds in conjunction with several other state funding
sources. ' This was to be a high water mark for TIF in North
Carolina: a large project with excellent development partners in a
location seeking new economic development.
The developers proceeded quickly and began construction at the
Research Campus prior to receiving approval for the TIF bonds. 88
However, rather than issuing the authorized TIF bonds, the
Kannapolis City Council began to explore different financing
mechanisms for the North Carolina Research Campus, 89 eventually
closing on the first set of bonds to finance portions of the project in
December 2010 for several reasons.2" Rather than using TIF,
however, the City of Kannapolis relied on two alternative forms of
financing: Limited Obligation Bonds and Build America Bonds.291
The $1.5 billion North Carolina Research Campus complex opened in
285. Id.; see also Easley Announces Rapid Response for Pillowtex Closing, WRAL.COM
(Jul. 31, 2003), http://www.wral.cominews/local/story/106176/ (expressing the frustrations
of former North Carolina Governor Mike Easley over the closing of Pillowtex and
describing the creation of a "Rapid Response Team" to help address the loss of jobs in
Kannapolis).
286. See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 11.
287. See Paul Chesser, NCRC Seeks Millions in Public Funds, CAROLINA J. ONLINE
(July 2, 2007), http://www.carolinajournal.comlexclusives/display-exclusive.html?id=4159
(noting additional state payments of $6 million to UNC system universities involved with
the Research Campus and $2.2 million for community colleges operating at the Research
Campus).
288. Id. (noting that the developer, Castle & Cooke, would build the North Carolina
Research Campus regardless of whether the TIF bonds were approved by the Local
Government Commission and that the TIFs would only determine how large the project
would be).
289. Hugh Fisher, Kannapolis Council Seeks Alternative Funding for Research Campus
Projects, SALISBURY POST (July 28, 2009), http://www.salisburypost.com/Area/072809-
kann-council-tif-plan.
290. See Legg, supra note 16 (describing events leading to the issuing of the first public
finance instruments by Mike Legg, Kannapolis City Manager, and noting "the downturn in
the economy" as a significant factor in the decision).
291. See id. (describing a smaller initial debt issue of $35 million, $30 million of which
would be devoted to specific capital projects). Build America Bonds are a form of debt
security created by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act that subsidize a larger
portion of the debt borrowing costs for local government capital projects. See Recovery
Act: Build America Bonds, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/recovery/Pages/babs.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2012).
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October 2008, and at least one large research project is already
underway. While this example could be seen as an aberration, it has
proven to be one of many examples where a local government has
chosen a different method of financing than TIF, often in a form with
many characteristics of TIF, but without some of the unique
constricting features of the North Carolina TIF statute."
These three case studies provide three different tales of TIF in
North Carolina. Roanoke Rapids provides a cautionary tale-for
those considering TIF, it is best to consider the feasibility of the
proposal as well as the capabilities of one's partners before issuing
TIF debt. Woodfin provides a success story-the developer and the
municipality cooperated, securitized the debt in a way that provided
less risk exposure to Woodfin's residents (as the private developer
guaranteed the security with a minimum assessment agreement), and
built a phased project with a longer maturity period for the TIF
bonds.294 However, perhaps the most important of these three
narratives is the North Carolina Research Campus. The project
dwarfs the others in terms of size and scope, and demonstrates two
larger points considered in Part V of this Comment: there are myriad
types of available debt financing substitutes for projects that might
otherwise utilize TIF bonds, as well as many other non-statutory
reasons that TIF has so far proven to be a tough sell in North
Carolina.
292. See Celeste Smith, Former NCSU Head Leads Research Campus, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Sept. 15, 2011, at 2B (describing a $35 million gift by Dole Foods owner
David Murdock to Duke University to fund a study aiming to "better understand diseases
that commonly affect the public health").
293. See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 12 (describing a number of development
plans in the works as of August 2008, including Raleigh's North Hills shopping center and
other TIF proposals in Winston Salem, Greensboro, Cary, and Carolina Beach). The
North Hills project, an $800 million mixed use development, was approved by the Wake
County Board of Commissioners in a form that has come to be known as a "synthetic
TIF," which differs from traditional TIF by requiring that the developer, not the city,
borrow the money and take responsibility for paying it back. See Dan Bowens, County
Endorses Plans for New North Hills Development, WRAL.COM (July 23, 2007),
http://www.wral.comInews/local/story/1624476/.
294. Compare supra note 249 and accompanying text (noting Roanoke Rapids' TIF
bond maturity date of twenty years, with an expected payment of interest on the TIF bond
debt within the first year), with supra note 274 and accompanying text (describing
Woodfin's TIF proposal of $12.96 million in TIF bond issues, which may increase to as
much as $25 million over a twenty-six- to thirty-year period).
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V. REASONS FOR INACTIVITY BEYOND THE TIF STATUTE 295
A. Alternative Forms of Debt Financing
While TIF is a popular form of financing for many local
governments, there are many other forms of debt financing that local
governments may use for economic development. 96  In North
Carolina, these can include synthetic TIFs using various forms of debt
financing, government grants, federally subsidized bonds, and many
others. Some of these financing mechanisms may accomplish the
295. Before discussing individual public finance options beyond TIF, it is worth noting
that TIF developments are part of a larger group of public financing options, commonly
referred to as Public-Private Partnerships. See URBAN LAND INST., TEN PRINCIPLES FOR
SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, at v (2005), available at
http:l/www.uli.org/wp-content/uploads/2005/01/TP-Yartnerships.pdf (defining Public
Private Partnerships as " 'creative alliances' formed between a governmental entity and
private developers to achieve a common purpose"). Public-Private Partnerships must be
for a "public purpose" and cannot be joint ventures with mutuality of control, as that
would violate article V of the North Carolina Constitution. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4(3)
(prohibiting the lending of a local government's credit to "any person, association, or
corporation" for any non-public purpose, unless a majority of qualified voters in the local
government unit approve the lending of credit); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 915 (9th ed.
2009) (defining a joint venture as allowing each member an "equal voice in controlling the
project"). The Supreme Court of North Carolina has determined that there is a
presumption of constitutionality for whether legislation serves the "public purpose"
required under Article V, see Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 714, 467
S.E.2d 615, 619 (1996) (stating that there is a presumption of constitutionality that
legislation favors the public purpose, that the legislature receives first responsibility for
determining what constitutes a public purpose, and that the legislature has been clear that
it considers expending public funds for economic development a public purpose), and has
further held that development agreements without a defined principal-agent relationship
do not constitute a joint venture. Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 560-63,
359 S.E.2d 792, 799-800 (1987) (holding that the development agreement was not a joint
venture, as there was not a fiduciary relationship created between the developer and the
city). There is also statutory authority allowing local governments to contract with private
parties for various defined purposes contained in the General Statutes of North Carolina.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-20.1 (2011) ("A city may contract with and appropriate money to
any person, association, or corporation, in order to carry out any public purpose that the
city is authorized by law to engage in."); id. §§ 158.7.1, 160A-488, 160A-489 (providing
authority to fund economic development parks, museum and art programs, and coliseums
and convention centers). Many of the following debt financing arrangements may be
considered public-private partnerships, as they involve governments working closely with
private developers to facilitate economic growth.
296. See Briffault, supra note 22, at 73 ("TIF, of course, is just one of many programs
available for local economic development or redevelopment-including enterprise zones,
tax abatements, special assessments and special benefit taxes, business improvement
districts ('BIDs') and other special districts, and intergovernmental grants, loans, and tax
credits."). The North Carolina Research Campus is one example of a development project
utilizing a different form of financing. See supra note 291 and accompanying text
(describing the project's use of federally subsidized bonds as well as limited obligation
bonds).
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same ends as a TIF while providing greater flexibility in repaying
debt.
1. "Synthetic" TIFs Through Up-Front Developer and Installment
Purchase Financing
One substitute for traditional TIF is "synthetic" TIF, which has
two varieties that can achieve similar results. 2 7 One form is a type of
"reverse TIF," where a private developer borrows money up front,
invests the funds in a "public project," and then receives a grant from
the local government unit to repurchase the initial assets based on the
tax increment increases-similar to some economic development
incentives.' A distinct advantage of this form of financing is that the
developer bears the initial risk that there will be no property tax
increases in the area; for example, if this form of synthetic TIF had
been used as the financing instrument in Roanoke Rapids, Moonlight
Bandit Productions would have been liable for the infrastructure
costs rather than the city. A disadvantage is that a smaller
municipality might have difficulties locating a developer to take the
risk at the outset of a project.
Another form of synthetic TIF typically utilizes installment
purchase financing, which requires the local government to take title
to the asset once construction is completed or the asset is delivered to
the local government unit. 299 Liens or security interests in the capital
asset funded by the special indebtedness secure the installment
purchase debt.3 ' This debt is then used to construct an asset to spur
development, similar to a traditional TIF district. Installment
purchases do not require a referendum," although they do carry the
traditional requirement of Local Government Commission approval
297. See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 5.
298. Id. This form of financing is treated similarly to the economic development
incentives offered to companies to relocate or remain in North Carolina. See § 158-7.1(a).
299. See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 5; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-20(b)
(2011) (permitting the use of installment contracts to secure payments on behalf of the
Local Government Commission to the private contractor making infrastructural
improvements).
300. See § 160A-20(b). Land may also be used if the limited obligation bonds will be
used to fund improvements on the land. Id. § 142-85(a)(2).
301. See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 5.
302. Compare § 160A-20 (providing statutory basis for installment purchase financing
without a voter referendum), with id. § 159-61(a) ("If a bond order is to take effect upon
approval of the voters, the affirmative vote or a majority of those who vote thereon shall
be required.").
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in most cases." In this version of synthetic TIF, a municipality issues
installment purchase debt to build infrastructure in a particular area
and then may use whatever revenues it sees fit to pay off the bonds
for the infrastructure.3 0
The advantages of using this form of synthetic TIF are that these
forms of debt do not require a bond referendum, nor does the
developer have to provide the funds up front as in the other form of
synthetic TIF. 05 There are downsides as well, as installment debt is
traditionally more expensive than general obligation debt.306 Further,
this form of debt does not allow minimum assessment agreements, as
the North Carolina TIF statute does,307 which may lead a local
government with higher credit risk to obtain other forms of
securitization of the debt.0 s This inability to secure minimum
assessments may also lead to higher interest rates than a traditional
TIF, as there is one less security (property tax increment revenue) to
pledge for the TIF bonds.
General obligation bonds-a traditional form of debt that
pledges a local government's full taxing power 309-may also be used
as a financing instrument for synthetic TIFs via a similar process.310
Like the installment purchase debt discussed above, a synthetic TIF
would issue general obligation bonds to create the public
infrastructure for a defined area, and would then be able to repay the
bonds through any collected governmental revenues." Since these
303. See id. §§ 159-51, 160A-20(e) (stating that bonds or installment contracts may not
issue without approval from the Local Government Commission).
304. See Wayne Cnty. Citizens Ass'n for Better Tax Control v. Wayne Cnty. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 328 N.C. 24, 31, 399 S.E.2d 311, 316 (1991) (holding that "[tihe possibility that
appropriations which might include income from tax revenues will be used to repay the
indebtedness under the contract is not a constitutionally significant factor" because the
general taxing authority is not pledged).
305. See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 5.
306. See Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 365, 382 (2004). Investors tend to prefer general obligation bonds because the
source of the repayment stream is typically the governmental unit's full taxing power. For
a recent discussion on municipal bond buying, see Nanette Byrnes, Municipal Bonds: 4
Rules for Investors, PORTFOLIOIST'S INSTABLOG (Feb. 1, 2011, 12:01 PM),
http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/763605-portfolioist/134777-four-rules-of-municipal-
debt-investing.
307. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-108(a), (c) (2011).
308. Cf id. § 159-153(d) (describing the various factors the Local Government
Commission takes into account when determining which financing arrangement to
pursue).
309, Id. §§ 159-45, 159-46.
310. See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 5 (describing the wide possible uses of




bonds are backed by the full faith and credit of the local government
unit, they tend to incur lower debt service costs. 12 However, general
obligation bonds also require a voter referendum, which can be a
long process and may be less favorable than TIF bonds or other forms
of debt that do not require a referendum.
Synthetic TIFs have been used to great effect by many North
Carolina municipalities, most notably the City of Charlotte.'
Charlotte lists eleven total projects that it has financed through
synthetic TIFs in its 2011 budget, including road development for a
recently opened IKEA. * In total, Charlotte estimates its synthetic
TIF projects will generate a net investment of $3.678 billion."' Like a
standard TIF, synthetic TIF has also been met with some criticism,
including claims that by devoting general fund revenues to repayment
of synthetic TIF debt, Charlotte is "playing with fire" and that
synthetic TIFs are simply a method of re-routing revenues away from
the city's general fund. 17
2. Special Assessment Improvement Districts
There are other ways to finance public infrastructure
improvements in North Carolina as well, including special assessment
districts. These districts have long existed,s impose assessments only
on benefitted property owners whose property values are affected by
the improvement, 319 and were traditionally levied to create and
312. Id.
313. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
314. See Synthetic Tax Increment Financing (TIF) Program, CITY CHARLOTTE,
http://charmeck.org/city/charlotte/nbs/ed/Pages/TIFProgram.aspx (last visited Sept. 26,
2012) (describing Charlotte's synthetic TIF policies).
315. CITY OF CHARLOTTE, ADOPTED FY2011 STRATEGIC OPERATING PLAN AND
FY2011-2015 CAPITAL INVESTMENT PLAN 123-24 (2011),
http://charmeck.org/city/charlotte/Budget/DocumentsFY2011%20Strategic%200perating
%20Plan.pdf.
316. Id. at 124.
317. Jeff. A Taylor, Michael Smith is Insane, MECK DECK, JOHN LOCKE FOUND. (Jan.
13, 2006, 5:13 PM), http://charlotte.johnlocke.org/blog/?p=377 (recounting TIF
experiences in Chicago and claiming Charlotte is "latch[ing] onto yesterday's bad idea and
... treating it like tomorrow's wave of the future"). One may also argue that should
property values not increase in the TIF district, other services that depend on general fund
revenue would possibly have to be cut to meet the TIF obligation.
318. See, e.g., Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 374, 381 (1908) (describing a
controversial special assessment district imposed by the City of Denver, Colorado in
1893).
319. See Kara A. Millonzi, An Overview of Special Assessment Bond Authority in
North Carolina, 40 PUB. FIN. BULL. 1, 1 (Nov. 2009) (describing traditional special
assessment law and new authorities for special assessment districts that will sunset in July
2013), http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs/lfb40.pdf.
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purchase water systems, streetlights, and other limited local
improvements.3 20 North Carolina's statutes also allow for a new form
of special assessment to address "critical infrastructure needs,"3 21
which allows for a much larger number of project types, including
capital costs for auditoriums, airports, art galleries, parks, and many
other capital assets 22 Before the local government unit can issue this
new, broader form of special assessment, it must receive a petition
signed by a majority of owners in the district to be assessed, and this
majority must control at least sixty-six percent of the property value
to be subject to the special assessment.323 The two forms of special
assessment also differ in another way: the newer form allows for the
pledging of revenue bonds and other debt financing to provide up-
front capital costs,3 24 while the older form does not typically allow the
special assessment to be pledged as a security, except when used as an
additional security for TIF.? North Carolina has, as compared to
some other states, used both the critical infrastructure and traditional
form of special assessment lightly,326 and the ability to use special
assessment backed debt through the critical infrastructure form of
special assessment is set to expire on July 1, 2013.327
320. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-185 (2011) (authorizing counties to use special
assessments for a number of infrastructural improvements).
321. See id. §§ 153A-210.1, 160A-239.1.
322. See Millonzi, supra note 319, at 6.
323. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-210.3, 160A-239.3 (2011). The original form of special
assessment did not contain the same petition requirement. See Millonzi, supra note 319, at
4.
324. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-210.4, 160A-239.4 (2011) (authorizing the use of
revenue bonds, TIF bonds, general obligation bonds, and "[gleneral revenues" to be used
for a special assessment district capital cost).
325. Millonzi, supra note 319, at 4-5 (noting that traditional special assessments cannot
be used as a security for debt in project costs). Revenue bonds allow a local government to
pledge the debt-financed asset as well as the revenues from the asset. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 159-82 (2011) ("The purpose of this Article is to ... vest authority in and enable
municipalities to secure and pay revenue bonds and the interest thereon solely out of
revenues without pledging the faith and credit of the municipality."); see also id. §§ 159-83,
159-91 (allowing the local government unit a security interest in the financed capital asset).
326. For a comparison of special assessments' use in North Carolina, Florida, and
Georgia, see ADAM C. PARKER & JEFFREY A. HUGHES, AN ASSESSMENT OF PACE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING ISSUES IN THREE STATES: HOW THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FINANCE AUTHORITY AND CULTURE OF SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS IN
NORTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA IMPAcT PROPERTY ASSESSED CLEAN
ENERGY PROGRAMS IN EACH STATE 37-42 (2012),
http://www.efc.unc.edulpublications/2012/PACEassessment.pdf.
327. Act of Aug. 3,2008, § 5,2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 642,646.
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3. Grants, Economic Development Incentives, and American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act Bonds
Local governments have also pursued funding from grant-
providing entities like the Golden Leaf Foundation. 2 8 Golden Leaf
recently pledged $100 million of a total $200 million in economic
development incentives to attract Spirit Aerosystems to Kinston,
North Carolina and to develop infrastructure for the aerospace
manufacturing firm. 29 The State also made a significant contribution
to develop the rail infrastructure-vitiating the need for a
municipality to use TIF in this economic development project.33 o
These incentive packages have recently proliferated, enticing Google
to establish a server farm in North Carolina and Dell to build a
computer-assembly plant in Winston-Salem. 3
In recent years, municipalities were also able to seek various
types of low-interest debt via the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act-Build America Bonds, Recovery Zone Economic
Development Bonds, Recovery Zone Facility Bonds, Qualified Zone
Academy Bonds, Qualified School Construction Bonds, Qualified
Energy Conservation Bonds, and Clean Renewable Energy Bonds.3
Although many of these instruments are now expiring, North
Carolina's local governments, perhaps at the expense of TIF
development, utilized many of these subsidized bonds."3
328. See About Us, GOLDEN LEAF FOUND., http://goldenleaf.orglabout.html (last
visited Sept. 28, 2012) (noting Golden Leafs creation by the North Carolina General
Assembly to administer half of the Master Settlement Agreement tobacco settlement).
329. See John W. McCurry, Spirit of Expansion: A Former Boeing Division Widens its
'Global Footprint,' 53 SITE SELECTION MAG. 902,904-905 (Nov. 2008).
330. John W. McCurry, Spirit of Expansion: A Former Boeing Division Widens its
'Global Footprint, SITE SELECTION ONLINE, http://www.siteselection.com/features
/2008/nov/Aerospacel (last visited Jan. 3,2012).
331. Jonathan Q. Morgan, Using Economic Development Incentives: For Better or for
Worse, POPULAR GOv'T, Winter 2009, at 16, 21, http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions
/pg/pgwin09/article3.pdf. The Dell plant shut down four years after opening, resulting in
the loss of over 900 jobs. Adam Owens, Dell to Close N.C. Plant, Eliminate 905 Jobs,
WRAL.CoM (Oct. 7,2009), http://www.wral.com/business/story/6156112/.
332. See IRS Releases Guidance on ARRA Bond Provisions, IRS.GoV,
http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Exempt-Bonds/IRS-Releases-Guidance-on-ARRA-Bond-
Provisions (last visited Sept. 28, 2012) (providing guidance and information relating to the
various tax-exempt and tax-credit bonds created by the 2009 American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act).
333. See Recovery Zone Bonds, N.C. OFF. ST. BUDGET & MGMT. (Dec. 31, 2010),
https://ncrecovery.gov/Opportunities/RecoveryZoneBonds.aspx (noting the December 31,
2010 deadline for issuing bonds under the legislation, as well as $417 million in Recovery
Zone Economic Development Bonds and $390 million in Recovery Zone Facility Bonds
issued).
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Lastly, many local governments may have opted for another
form of redevelopment under the state's Urban Redevelopment
Law.33 4 Prior to 2006, this law allowed for the exercise of eminent
domain in blighted areas, but has since been changed to allow for
exercise only in blighted parcels."'s Urban redevelopment areas were
utilized frequently in North Carolina.3 3 6 Urban redevelopment
commissions' ability to issue debt to fund projects in urban
redevelopment areas," along with other economic development
tools, may have reduced the need for TIF.338
B. Other Potential Reasons TIF Stalled in North Carolina
In addition to the multiple alternative financing schemes
available in North Carolina, a number of other environmental factors
may have contributed to TIF's non-use. For example, the financial
crisis of 2008 stalled the municipal bond market considerably.339 The
municipal debt markets have not rebounded significantly since the
financial crisis, and some major investors who previously expressed
faith in the municipal debt market, such as Warren Buffett, have
334. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 160A, art. 22 (2011).
335. See Tyler Mulligan, Kelo Revisited: Eminent Domain for Economic Development
in North Carolina, COATES' CANONS: NC LOC. Gov'T BLOG, U. N.C. CHAPEL HILL SCH.
Gov'T (Nov. 17, 2009), http://canons.sog.unc.edul?p=1288. For an argument against the
use of the "building by building approach," see generally Carolyn A. Pearce, Recent
Development, Forcing Urban Redevelopment to Proceed "Building by Building": North
Carolina's Flaws Policy Response to Kelo v. City of New London, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1784
(2006) (critiquing the North Carolina General Assembly's policy response to Kelo and
arguing that the piece-by-piece approach will lead to inefficient redevelopment by
practitioners).
336. For a historic example of urban redevelopment in North Carolina, see Durham
Urban Renewal Records, DURHAM CNTY. LIBR., http://digitalnc.org/collections/durham
(last visited Oct. 3, 2012) (providing a visual history of properties included in urban
renewal efforts, as well as other documents such as property appraisals). The Durham
Redevelopment Commission was created in 1958 to oversee seven projects of "urban
renewal aimed at combating 'urban blight.' " Id.
337. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-512(8) (2011). Use of the eminent domain power on
unblighted parcels was also affirmed by the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
Redevelopment Comm'n of Greensboro v. Johnson, 129 N.C. App. 630, 632-33, 500
S.E.2d 118, 120-21 (1998).
338. Note that cities may finance redevelopment projects using the proceeds of TIF
debt along with other revenues available to the city. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-515.1 (2011).
Redevelopment commissions may act to include several redevelopment areas within a TIF
district, subject to the land maximum thresholds found in the TIF statute. See id.





recently made financial decisions which indicate doubts about the
long-term viability of municipal debt offerings.34 0
North Carolina employs a broader scheme of regulating local
government debt financing, even in buoyant financial times, which
may also contribute to the non-use of TIF.341 The Local Government
Commission reviews all debt issued by municipalities, the state sells
the securities, and the state ensures that local governments
experiencing fiscal stress do not default on their bonds." 2 Such an
exacting standard is not widespread in other states, but it has ensured
that credit rating agencies hold North Carolina's local government
debt in high regard.3 43 This policy choice has perhaps lowered the use
of TIF in North Carolina, but has also contributed to favorable debt
management practices in the state.
TIF may also have an image problem resulting from the Carolina
Crossroads TIF district. As the first use of TIF in North Carolina, it
created the first impression and has certainly received its share of
scorn that may repel potential TIF users.344 Local governments may
be more likely to look at TIF with a more skeptical eye than they
would if the first impression had been a positive one, especially with
so many other alternative financing instruments available that have
not received as much negative press (such as synthetic TIFs).
CONCLUSION
A. What is the Future of TIF in North Carolina?
As discussed above, there are numerous reasons that economic
developers and local government entities choose to eschew the
statutory form of TIF in North Carolina.345 Some argue that the
340. Serena Ng & Michael Corkery, Buffett's Move Raises a Red Flag: Some Investors
Say Terminating Default Protection on Muni Debt May Signal Unease on Public Finances,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2012, at C1 (noting Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.'s recent termination of
credit-default swaps, originally purchased in 2007, that insured $8.25 billion of municipal
debt).
341. See Charles K. Coe, Preventing Local Government Fiscal Crises: The North
Carolina Approach, PUBLIC BUDGETING & FINANCE, Fall 2003, at 39,41-45, available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.comdoill0.1111/j.1540-5850.2007.00879.x/full.
342. Id. at 41.
343. Id. at 3940.
344. Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 13 ("The recent negative publicity garnered
by the first approved TIF project in North Carolina-the Roanoke Rapids (Randy Parton)
Theater-has not helped the cause of promoting TIF use.").
345. See generally D. Shawn Purvis, Tax Increment Financing in North Carolina: Great
Expectations, Limited Use (Feb. 3, 2008) (unpublished M.P.A. Capstone Paper,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill),
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limited uses permitted by the North Carolina TIF statute and the TIF
district creation process have hindered TIF's use."' Others laud
North Carolina's conservative approach to debt financing," which
keeps bond ratings strong, but might also foreclose some economic
development opportunities in the state.348
However, it is clear that local governments are choosing to
employ other public finance mechanisms to encourage economic
development and build community infrastructure, and some of these
devices, like synthetic TIF, are similar in structure to TIF.3 49 In some
ways, TIF in North Carolina is the story of TIF in most states,
particularly in the South and Southeast; TIF legislation is passed and
touted as an essential "tool in the toolbox," but is instead used
sparingly, if at all. 50 Given the statutory complexity of TIF, the
additional intergovernmental reporting requirements, the land-use
restrictions, the negative recent history, and, perhaps most
importantly, the availability of public financing substitutes which do
not attempt to structurally constrict revenue sources to tax increments
and a few additional pledged securities, TIF will likely remain a
sparsely used financing instrument in North Carolina.
Of course, the world does not remain constant, and TIF use may
be affected by recent legislation designed to decrease involuntary
annexation within the state."s' This legislation makes it more difficult
for municipalities to involuntarily annex land without approval by
property owners in unincorporated districts, while also allowing low-
income residents easier access to municipal services.35 2 Further,
http://www.mpa.unc.edu/sites/www.mpa.unc.edu/files/ShawnPurvis.pdf (finding, for
example, that project scale, statute complexity, negative perceptions, and land area
restrictions have hindered the use of TIF in North Carolina).
346. See David Jones, Amendment One, Zero Deals, CHARLOTTE BUS. J., Nov. 4,2005,
at 59, available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/stories/2005/11/07/editoriall.html?s=print.
347. See Coe, supra note 341, at 40 ("The North Carolina system serves as a model to
other states.").
348. See, e.g., Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 11 (using a $5 million TIF project in
Cayce, South Carolina-for the creation of a riverfront park-as an example that TIF can
work, even in smaller communities); Petersen, supra note 70, at 602 (counting 100 TIF
districts in South Carolina).
349. See supra notes 297, 314-16 and accompanying text.
350. See Petersen, supra note 70, at 604 (stating that southern states have, on average,
only thirty-nine TIF districts).
351. See generally An Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North
Carolina, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 396 (overhauling substantial portions of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-58).
352. See Frayda Bluestein, Annexation Reform: A Summary of the New Law, COATES'
CANONS: NC LOc. GOv'T BLOG, U. N.C. CHAPEL HILL SCH. Gov'T (July 15, 2011, 8:15
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accompanying legislation permitted several recently annexed
communities to de-annex themselves, which may create problems for
the respective local governments that often pledge significant debt
service payments to finance water and sewer improvements after
undertaking an annexation.13  This legislation distressed North
Carolina's cities as well as the North Carolina League of
Municipalities.' Ultimately, additional strain may be placed on
municipal budgets, causing municipalities to revisit alternative forms
of financing for improvements, such as TIF.
Additionally, North Carolina local governments continue to
maintain low debt-to-property-value ratios," which are likely
influenced by a policy choice within the Local Government
Commission to keep the amount of debt carried by each unit low." If
the Local Government Commission maintains conservative debt ratio
targets, municipalities will continue to have less access to TIF or other
AM), http://sogweb.sog.unc.edulblogs/localgovt/?p--4494 (noting that an annexation may
be now terminated if sixty percent of residents within an annexed area sign a petition to
deny annexation, and that voluntary annexation is allowed in areas where resident
incomes are less than 200% of the poverty level and where fifty-one percent of the
residents in the area petition for annexation).
353. See id. ("[Two other session laws] allow completed annexations in nine cities to be
terminated by petition of the owners of 60% of the annexed parcels.").
354. See Kelli Kukura, Annexation Reform Becomes Law Without Governor's
Signature, N.C. LEAGUE MUNICIPALITIES (June 30, 2011),
http:llwww.nclm.orgilegislative-advocacy/Pages/WhatsNewDetail.aspx?List=b431d83a-
0059-4b54-b8aa-9382b5120a9a&ID=153 ("This is a major overhaul of annexation laws that
have served North Carolina well for more than 50 years.").
355. North Carolina counties have seen low totals of debt as a percentage of total
property valuations: for example, counties with populations of 250,000 or larger have the
highest percentage of debt to valuation, at just over 2.1%, while all counties are just over
1.4%. Municipalities have even lower debt to valuation ratios, with the average property
valuation to debt percentage standing at .74%. See DEP'T OF STATE TREASURER, Div. OF
STATE AND LOCAL GOv'T FIN., ANALYSIS OF DEBT OF NORTH CAROLINA COUNTIES
AND MUNICIPALITIES AT 6-30-2011, at 1 (2011), https://www.nctreasurer.com/slg
/Debt%20Management/DebtAnalysisReport.pdf.
356. While not indicative of local government debt ratio targets, state debt ratio targets
remain conservative. For example, the North Carolina State Treasurer (the parent
organization of the Local Government Commission) has adopted a policy for the 2012-13
fiscal year that will keep North Carolina's total state debt capacity at current levels. See
DEBT AFFORDABILITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA: DEBT
AFFORDABILITY STUDY 1 (2012), https://www.nctreasurer.com/slg/Debt
%20Affordability/2012-DAAC.pdf (outlining the target rate of four percent and noting
that current debt levels exceed this target slightly); Lee Weisbecker, Janet Cowell:
Moratorium on Debt, TRIANGLE Bus. J. (Feb. 3, 2012, 9:37 AM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/news/2012/02/03/janet-cowell-moratorium-on-
debt.html (discussing the North Carolina State Treasurer's Affordability Advisory
Committee's conclusion that the state's current level of debt is manageable).
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debt financing programs.5 Thus, any local governments that wish to
begin publicly funded economic development projects will likely have
to wait until market conditions improve, seek private investment via
the "reverse" TIF variety of synthetic TIF, or seek grant funding.
B. What Reforms Can North Carolina Enact to Encourage More TIF
Projects?
North Carolina could enact several reforms to simplify the TIF
statute and increase its use. The first, and likely most effective, would
be removal of the five percent land requirement and constrictions on
land use."5 When counties issue debt, the five percent requirement
becomes less of an impediment, as shown by Buncombe County's use
of TIF to create a town center in Woodfin,5 9 because counties
typically have a larger landmass to work with than cities. Cities do not
enjoy this same flexibility. The five percent requirement also appears
to push North Carolina local government units toward a "project-
specific TIF approach" rather than a "district-wide TIF approach."3 60
Project-specific TIFs tend to be, as the name implies, geared toward a
single developer or tract of land, much like the Carolina Crossroads
TIF district.361 Project-specific TIFs also tend to be riskier and create
additional hurdles for those who would invest in TIF bonds, as
repayment of the bonds is dependent on the single investor and
whatever additional securities are pledged toward repayment of the
TIF bonds. 62 The district-wide approach appears to be more favored
nationally in situations where there is a larger area to develop, and it
357. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
358. This Section addresses changes that can be made to the statutes and regulatory
framework surrounding TIF. Local governments operating within the current framework
can and should enact several measures to ensure that, should they decide to use TIF, they
do so responsibly. For further discussion of steps to creating an effective TIF policy, see
generally Laura Jensen, Elements of an Effective Tax Increment Financing Policy for
North Carolina Local Governments (2008) (unpublished M.P.A. Capstone Paper,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill),
http://www.sog.unc.edulsites/www.sog.unc.edulfiles/MPA%20captstone08-
effective%20TIF%20policy.pdf (suggesting that local governments outline the elements of
North Carolina's TIF law, identify the policy goals of using TIF, determine how much risk
a local government is willing to assume, explore what the costs of financing are and what
alternatives exist, discover its citizens' views on TIF, and establish evaluation criteria to
determine how well TIF is meeting the goals of the community).
359. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
360. See CDFA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 18, at 12-14.
361. Id. at 13.
362. Id. Another argument proffered against the project-specific approach is that it
tends to be narrower in focus and does not stimulate the long range visioning that acts as a
catalyst for broader redevelopment. Id.
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brings the benefit of multiple developers so the TIF district's success
is not placed in the hands of a single developer. 6 However, use of the
district-wide approach may also make TIF function similarly to
special assessment districts, which are designed specifically to address
infrastructure challenges in a broader area of a municipality or
county.3" As noted above,365 traditional special assessment districts
are limited in scope,366 and the broader authority granted to the new
form of special assessment district expires in July 2013.367 Removing
the five-percent requirement may allow TIF to bridge the gap created
when or if the newer form of special assessment district expires.
Another way to increase the use of TIF would be to remove the
ability to use alternative debt financing instruments, like "synthetic"
TIFs. However, this seems more akin to cutting off one's nose to spite
one's face-these alternative forms of financing have been utilized
more frequently in North Carolina than TIF, with some degree of
success." Removal of these alternative debt instruments seems
unlikely as well as imprudent. Perhaps a more reasonable revision
would be the removal of some limitations on what TIFs may be used
for to better equalize the instruments. For example, "synthetic" TIFs
are not subject to the same twenty percent maximum threshold that
the TIF statute imposes on some TIF districts. 69 More equalized
allowances for use might make TIF a more attractive option than
synthetic TIF to some, as TIF still retains a guaranteed property tax
assessment agreement option that synthetic TIFs do not.370
Some might reform TIF by allowing for additional forms of
security to be used in conjunction with TIF bonds, although nearly all
options for financing-aside from general obligation bonds-are
363. Id. at 13-14.
364. See Millonzi,supra note 319, at 1.
365. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
366. See Millonzi, supra note 319, at 6 (explaining how the scope of authority provided
to special assessment districts under the General Assembly's 2008 legislation is broader
than what was allowed under the traditional model).
367. Id. at 1.
368. See supra notes 314-16 and accompanying text.
369. See Kara Millonzi, Local Gov't Debt Financing Primer: Enhanced Security for
Project Development Financings, COMMUNITY & ECON. DEV. N.C. & BEYOND, U. N.C.
CHAPEL HILL SCH. GOv'T (Nov. 29, 2011), http://sogweb.sog.unc.edu/blogs/ced/?p=3561
(describing additional options for debt security with North Carolina TIF, including
minimum assessed value agreements, mortgage interests in the financed asset, additional
revenues, and voted general obligation bond debt, none of which include the twenty
percent threshold of TIF).
370. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-108(a) (2011).
7152013]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
already available without a referendum.17 'An argument could be
made for removing the voting requirement for pledging general
obligation bonds, 372 but this would require amending the state
constitution to repeal portions of article V.373 This would also run
counter to the arguments of some who call for greater governmental
and voter oversight of TIFs and public debt in general. The John
Locke Foundation, for example, suggests TIFs should be voted upon,
that the Local Government Commission should increase its scrutiny
of TIF projects, that the TIF statute should include "protections
against inappropriate private benefits and conflicts of interest," and
that the Local Government Commission should implement
protections that deny a TIF project if it is not likely to generate
increases in tax revenues.74
Last, but perhaps least realistically, North Carolina lawmakers
could reduce procedural safeguards in the TIF statute that require
intergovernmental notification and approval from the Local
Government Commission. Not simply TIF debt, but all North
Carolina debt, would be procedurally easier to issue if Local
Government Commission approval was removed as a requirement for
issuing debt. Especially for smaller communities, the amount of
planning required for TIFs to pass the Local Government
Commission's scrutiny may be a discouraging factor-a simpler
approval process might provide easier access to capital through TIF
bonds. However, removal of these layers of approval may remove one
of the provident features of municipal finance in North Carolina, one
that has contributed to the state's receipt of the high bond ratings and
lower rates of interest for municipal debt. 75 Further, the Local
Government Commission sells and markets local government bonds
371. See Kara Millonzi, Legality of Non-Voted Debt to Finance Capital Projects,
COATES' CANONS: NC Loc. GOv'T L. BLOG, U. N.C. CHAPEL HILL SCH. GOv'T (June
30, 2010), http://sogweb.sog.unc.edulblogs/localgovt/?p=2720 (providing a general
overview of non-voted debt requirements and limitations, as well as general obligation
bonds).
372. See Tydgat, supra note 230, at 3 (finding that states with bond referendum
requirements tend to issue a similar amount of debt per capita as states without a
referendum requirement, while paying a higher rate of interest for this non-general
obligation bond debt).
373. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4 (providing that a local government may not "contract
debts secured by a pledge of its faith and credit unless approved by a majority of the
qualified voters of the unit who vote thereon").
374. JOHN LOCKE FOUND., supra note 273, at 1.
375. See TOM KOZLIK & ALAN SCHANKEL, MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET MONTHLY
13 (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.janney.com/File%2OLibrary/Fixed%201ncome/October-
2011.pdf (noting that North Carolina retains a AAA rating from Moody's, Standard and
Poor's, and Fitch rating agencies).
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through its bond sales division,7 often helping find purchasers of
local government bonds for smaller localities that might otherwise
have difficulty placing their debt. While it may create procedural
simplicity to remove Local Government Commission approval, it
would create practical difficulties for these communities when
searching for purchasers of their debt. Ultimately, it is highly unlikely
that the Local Government Commission would be dispensed with-it
has existed since a high number of government bond defaults in the
wake of the Great Depression, and has consistently offered assistance
to localities that have experienced difficulty in repaying their bond
debt." In short, it is a well-regarded institution in North Carolina.7 8
C. Should North Carolina Retain TIF as a Public Finance Option?
A strong argument can be made to remove TIF entirely from
public financing options in North Carolina. TIF is cumbersome to use,
clutters the public finance statute "toolbox," and other development
methods, such as synthetic TIF, have proven easier to use. To the last
point, TIF requires a freezing of property values within defined city
boundaries to pay for capital assets through increases in TIF district
property values.3 79 In practice, TIF constricts the funds that can be
used to pay debt, unless the TIF debt is secured by another asset such
as a sales tax, property lien, or a letter of credit.380 Thus, if a TIF
district struggles in its early stages, it is crippled by not being able to
shore up the project with other non-tax revenues to pay down the
debt. Eventually, if a TIF has failed, local governments may be
required to increase taxes to protect their credit ratings .3 1 Synthetic
TIFs, not explicitly secured by tax increments, do not have this
structural disadvantage. 8
To illustrate this point, Roanoke Rapids experienced the effect
of using conscribed revenues to pay down TIF debt firsthand and
quickly depleted the debt reserve for its theatre amidst already
376. See Carter, supra note 247, at 77-78.
377. See Coe, supra note 341, at 40, 43 (noting that North Carolina had the second
highest number of bond defaults during the Great Depression era, with sixty-two counties,
152 cities, and around 200 special taxing districts defaulting on the principal, interest, or
both). This high level of default provided the impetus for the General Assembly to create
the Local Government Commission. Id. at 40.
378. One additional option would be removal of the requirement for county and city
notification. This option may be worth exploring, but would likely create additional
tensions between city and county governments.
379. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
380. See Millonzi, supra note 371.
381. Blocher & Morgan, supra note 12, at 10.
382. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
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significant budget shortfalls."' Without generalized revenues to rely
on and lacking appreciable gains in tax increment, the debt service for
the theatre loomed large for the city, prompting the city council to
explore options for additional revenue, such as an ultimately
unsuccessful one-cent sales tax increase. " Likely facing a large
amount of debt service and the specter of default, Roanoke Rapids
attempted to sell the theatre for $7 million to recoup some of its $21.5
million expense, 85 and is currently leasing the facility to a new tenant
who operates an internet gambling and entertainment business with
an uncertain future.386 This was not the story that Roanoke Rapids
hoped to tell when it opened the theatre doors in 2007.
Conversely, North Carolina local governments are not similarly
constricted when using increases in the generalized tax base to pay for
an asset without a TIF. For example, if a city built a theatre with a
form of debt besides TIF, such as a traditional general obligation
bond, the city could use not only the potential incremental gains in
property tax surrounding the theatre, but also other revenues of the
governmental unit to pay off the capital asset. This flexibility is
valuable, especially if things do not go as planned and the city hopes
to retain its capital asset or to pay down the debt at an accelerated
pace in order to move past mistakes and toward future projects. TIF's
structure makes the city or county highly dependent on the
continuation of property value increases. When such increases do not
arise, the areas from which the local government may pay their debt
service are either non-existent (due to the lack of an increment),
limited to additional pledged securities (such as a sales tax or sale of
the underlying asset), or would require a later pledge of the city's
general taxing power through property tax increases, which is the
constitutional issue that TIF was confronting in the first place.387
Perhaps rather than aiming to reform TIF, North Carolina
lawmakers might aim to reform synthetic forms of TIF to meet policy
383. See Roger Bell, Roanoke Rapids Budget Deadline Looming, DAILY HERALD
(June 23, 2011), http://www.rrdailyherald.con/news/roanoke-rapids-budget-deadline-
looming/article_869b451e-9dbe-11e0-a44e-001cc4cO3286.html.
384. See Carrington, supra note 1 (noting that the sales tax was not authorized by the
General Assembly).
385. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
386. See The Royal Palace Theatre Opens Wednesday, supra note 10; see also Hest
Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue, No. 169A11-2, 2012 WL 6218202, at *11 (N.C. Dec. 14,
2012).
387. See Juby, supra note 17, at 1534 (noting that if TIF district proves unsuccessful and
the increments are not sufficient to service the bond debt, city officials might raise tax
rates to cover the shortfall, creating a situation where a city's full faith and credit are
pledged through tax increases).
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goals. As synthetic TIF provides greater flexibility and is easier to
implement, it will likely continue to enjoy greater use. Reforms to
synthetic TIF may include formalizing the practice and providing
similar procedural safeguards as TIF for these developer agreements,
allowing synthetic TIFs to secure minimum assessed value
agreements as an additional security for bonds in synthetic TIF zones,
or, for those who oppose non-voted debt in general, voting
requirements for the bonds used in synthetic TIFs. Each proposed
reform will have its advantages and weaknesses, which are beyond
the scope of this Comment.
The final, and perhaps best, option is simply to leave the TIF
statute and the debt structures allowing for synthetic TIF as they are.
North Carolina enjoys a favorable bond rating due in no small part to
its debt management strategies and approval mechanisms.' The state
has devised a debt issuance strategy-synthetic TIF-that retains the
benefits of TIF without, predominantly, the negative experiences seen
in other states.? While the State's model may be too conservative for
some, it reflects a policy choice that keeps debt service rates low39
while still allowing for local governments to use public finance
instruments to encourage growth and prosperity in their communities.
ADAM C. PARKER
388. See Coe, supra note 341, at 39-40.
389. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
390. See Coe, supra note 341, at 45-46.
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